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Abstract
Recent emphasis and attention by thinkers, media pundits, and politicians
on terrorism requires new, critical evaluation of the processes by which terrorism
is understood. By investigating the concept of biopolitics, as developed
specifically through Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben, new insights into
the interactions between terrorism, politics, and religion can emerge. Most
notably, the attempts to explain terror as simply an economic problem, an
excessive form of violence, and/or as religious fervency gone awry rely on
embedded biopolitical concepts. The continual attempts to solve terrorism
through increased biopolitical strategies, thereby making terrorism a problem for
biopolitics, only further substantiate the crisis that biopolitics brings about in the
first place. Carefully investigating the relationship between biopolitical theory
and religious concepts uncovers those very motivations of defining terrorism in
certain forms (economically problematic, excessively violent, religiously
passionate), and the continued insistence that terrorism is another problem to be
solved, like any other political issue. Instead, I propose that by taking the
religious concepts of biopolitics seriously, we can reimagine terror as heresy,

ii

requiring a different political calculus articulating terrorism not as a problem for
biopolitics to fix but instead as a problem of biopolitics.
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Introduction: The Power of Terror

In March of 2014, a group dressed in all black and using knives and
1

swords rushed into the Kunming Railway Station killing twenty-nine civilians
and injuring approximately 140 more. Police subsequently killed four of the
assailants, and arrested one, while the other attackers were captured days later
by authorities. In the immediate aftermath, no known terrorist organizations
took responsibility for the attack, but many in the media quickly reported that
those who perpetrated the attack belonged to the community of Uyghur
Muslims. While a minor terrorist incident by strictly numerical standards, the
repercussions of this attack provide insights into central issues within terrorist
studies and contemporary geopolitics. Amidst the tragedy and loss of life, a
provocative dialogue of the event rose to the surface regarding the classification
of the Kunming attack as either terrorism or something else.
The New York Times in March of 2014 detailed the transition by the US
State Department as they officially adopted the language of terrorism. In the
2

words of Jen Psaki, a spokesperson for the State Department,

1

Some put the number of attackers at 8 while other sources say 10.

Didi Kristen Tatlow, “After Prodding, U.S. State Department Labels Kunming
Attack ‘Terrorism’,” New York Times, March 4, 2014, accessed March 25, 2014,
1
2

Well, we acknowledge that China has characterized the incident as a
terror act. We extend our condolences for the loss of life. We of course
oppose terrorism in all of its forms, and based on the information reported
by the Chinese media, this appears to be an act of terrorism targeting
random members of the public. We don’t have any other independent
information, but again, we of course deplore violence intentionally
directed at innocent civilians in any case, regardless of whether —
regardless of the cause. So that is where we are.
3

The article continues with a Beijing reporter questioning Psaki on the
hesitancy of the US to officially label the Kunming attack as “terrorism.”

4

Additionally, an article from the China’s state press agency Xinhua speaks of
world leaders joining in condemnation of the attacks, and while this news
agency pressed the point of terrorism fairly heavily, none of the world leaders
cited specifically called the act terrorism. In fact, in a convoluted statement,
5

Russian president Vladimir Putin called the Kunming attack a “criminal act,”
while simultaneously promising further partnerships in counterterrorism efforts.

6

The eventual concession by the State Department in calling the act
terrorism only generates further turmoil regarding the nature and scope of
terrorism in modern international discourse. First, it highlights the reality that

http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/04/after-prodding-u-s-statedepartment-labels-kunming-attack-terrorism.
3

Ibid.

For a full transcript of the conversation between Jen Psaki and Bingru Wang, see
“State Department Daily Briefing,” March 3, 2014,
http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/texttrans/2014/03/20140304295315
.html.
4

“International Community Condemns Terrorist Attack in China,” March 2,
2014, accessed March 25 , 2014,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2014-03/02/c_133154326.htm.
5

th

6

Ibid.
2

we possess no representative definition of terrorism, in either domestic or
international form. This is even more unnerving when put into the context of an
ongoing global “War on Terror” that lacks a fundamental and comprehensive
means of defining the very object of this war. Second, the international
community lacks any comprehensive and objective way by which to differentiate
“acts of terror” from terrorism. Are the two related in some meaningful way, or
7

separated by political, theoretical, or rhetorical lines? Third, what conditions,
ideas, and strategic consequences motivate the hesitancy or confidence for
naming an act “terrorism?” On the one hand, one can ignore these questions as
unnecessary parsing of the terminology and claim that Chinese and American
relations are strained for a variety of complicated reasons, resulting in a general
attitude of suspicion. On the other, the US and other human rights groups have
continually cited China’s treatment of the Uyghur people as notably atrocious,
intimating that this attack serves as a horrific reminder of the capability of those
who have been repressed in such extreme ways to resort to violence.

8

Ignoring these questions and concerns as unproductive nitpicking has its
attraction. However, we are still left with some mystery surrounding this attack
and its consequences; most notably why China remains so adamant this was, in
fact, terrorism. This unwavering insistence on the act being terror suggests

One might be reminded of the Clinton administration’s failure to call Rwanda a
genocide, and instead opting for the less declarative claim that they were “acts of
genocide.”
7

Hannah Beech, “Deadly Terrorist Attack in Southwestern China Blamed on
Separatist Muslim Uighurs,” Time, March 1, 2014, accessed March 25, 2014,
http://time.com/11687/deadly-terror-attack-in-southwestern-china-blamed-onseparatist-muslim-uighurs/.
3
8

political capital accompanying the label of terrorism in a way unlike criminality
or simply an “act of terror.” The naming of an act as “terrorism” imparts
discursive coding about human rights, political action, military justification, and
so on.
The Kunming attack underscores a central issue in the world of terrorism
studies: The failure of defining terrorism produces unintended political
consequences. The definition of terrorism, and acts that constitute it, carries
profound political power. The ability to enact new political partnerships or
justify violence occurs when the governing officials and political elites label an
act terrorism. As a side effect, such naming power also carries the ability to
constitute other activities and then codify appropriate actions in response.
Should something be merely criminal, as the case may be regarding Kunming, a
certain set of actions are permissible. While claiming something as terror not
only constitutes and codifies what one may do in the face of terror, but
simultaneously co-constitutes other violent acts as criminal, hate crimes,
narcotics related, domestic violence, etc. Each act of naming closes off and
opens new discursive territories for a litany of other related terms and claims.
The term “terrorism” constitutes something special vis-à-vis other things
such as criminality or even hate crime. Terrorism represents a central and
substantial organizing tool for politics. It is like a strainer through which
disparate political discourse and ideas pass.
It is not surprising that in the run-up to the 2016 presidential election,
democratic hopeful Bernie Sanders made several comments during debates that

4

connected terrorism with climate change. Likewise, in a speech following the
9

attack on a nightclub in Florida Donald Trump made the following remarks:
A radical Islamic terrorist targeted the nightclub not only because he
wanted to kill Americans, but in order to execute gay and lesbian citizens
because of their sexual orientation. It is a strike at the heart and soul of
who we are as a nation. It is an assault on the ability of free people to live
their lives, love who they want to and express their identity. It is an attack
on the right of every single American to live in peace and safety in their
own country. We need to respond to this attack on American as one
united people – with force, purpose and determination. But the currently
politically correct response cripples our ability to talk and think and act
clearly.
He continues even more emphatically, “The bottom line is that the only
reason the killer was in America in the first place was because we allowed his
family to come here.” Trump connects the ideas of terrorism to sexual identity,
10

to the right of security, to the debates around political correctness, and to
questions surrounding immigration.
Terrorism is not merely a “hot button” issue, rather, terrorism has become
a central point by which we organize and distribute meaning across the entirety
of the political spectrum. Every potential political issue can attach to the purview
of terrorism in some way: financial markets, drug trade, free movement of goods,
migration, security, war, climate change, food distribution, and biological studies
all intersect with terrorism.

Nick Gas, “Sanders Doubles Down: ‘Climate Change is Directly Related to the
Rise of Global Terrorism,” Politico November 14 , 2014, accessed April 11 , 2015,
http://www.politico.com/blogs/live-from-des-moines/2015/11/berniesanders-climate-change-terrorism-215874
9
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“Donald Trump Addresses Terrorism, Immigration and National Security,”
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/press-releases/donald-j.-trump-addressesterrorism-immigration-and-national-security This press release has since been
taken down from the official website.
5
10

Rather than attempt (and fail) at providing yet another definition of
terrorism, changing the way in which we examine the topic provides insight into
this most nebulous and prolific field. Instead of asking how people become
radicalized, or the ways in which religion leads to violence, we should be asking a
set of questions of why and how terrorism has come to dominate the field of politics in
such a far-reaching fashion. I contend that the nature of neoliberal politics in recent
years contributes to this phenomenon, particularly the rise to dominance of
organizing political power around the management of life in the most abstract
form. By managing life, biopower centralizes terrorism as a primary and
fundamental problem for ongoing political institutions of all varieties. Yet,
biopolitics ultimately cannot solve the problem of terror, because terror exposes
and undermines the foundational aspects of biopower. Biopower makes
terrorism a problem that can be overcome, yet I argue that terrorism only arises
because of a series of paradoxical issues embedded in biopolitical motivations,
actions, and philosophical organization. Biopolitics regards terrorism as a
problem for which solutions are available, yet I hope to show how terrorism is, in
fact, a problem of biopolitics.
Carl Schmitt’s declaration that the political ultimately comes down to the
friend and enemy divide provides some basic parameters in attempting to
uncover why terrorism has arisen to such political prominence in contemporary
biopolitical formations. Obviously, in this moment of history the figure of the
terrorist serves as the defining enemy for the West. Likewise, the emboldened
citizens who seek war against this nefarious force come to constitute the “friend”
within Schmitt’s model. However, the enemy does not arrive independent from
6

the confines of history. No concept of enemy exists detached and abstracted
from real human experience. Rather, there are series of historical enemies, which
over time take on an essential category. At different times this concept of enemy
has taken on demonstrably different meanings: The Communist, the Fascist, and
so forth. One could trace a series of historical moments all defined by different
enemies, with different agendas and political properties. Every people, nation,
city, and community goes through a series of enemies, never abstracted and
always continuously subject to historical context.
This contemporary enemy (terrorism) has much in common with previous
incarnations of the enemy while at the same time producing new and contrasting
elements. For one, the general and globalized element of this enemy is not new.
This was a common theme throughout the Cold War. Yet this form of
globalization takes on a new element because of the contemporary enemy
lacking a specified or even symbolic geographic region. For Communism, the
U.S.S.R. served as the symbolic spatial center of the far more abstract Communist
ideology. It was tethered to geographic conditions. Terrorism, on the other
hand, completely lacks a spatial center, symbolic or otherwise.
In response to this new historical iteration we must ask the historical
situation whereby this thing “terror” arises as the primary form of the enemy
and as a related question, what other enemies consequently have been ignored.
To respond we need a thorough exploration of the general discursive climate and
the circulation of ideas that attempt to explain the importance of terrorism.
Terrorism highlights unique elements of biopolitics and the subsequent
neoliberal state. Through first examining the narratives that have come to
7

dominate terrorism, as a field of inquiry, I show that many of those narratives
rely on a central disavowing of the religious tendencies of biopolitics. This
disavowal produces a series of narratives that mischaracterize and
misunderstand the complicated relationship between terrorism and neoliberal
states. Instead of allowing such mischaracterizations of this relationship to
continue, I insist on highlighting the religious dimensions of biopolitics in a way
that allows for new insights into the ongoing war on terror. By viewing
terrorism, and the ongoing struggle against terror, through the lens of heresy I
open new possibilities of understanding terror, and more importantly, new
possibilities for understanding biopolitics and the neoliberal state.

Explanations of Terror

The first characterization and explanation of how terror has come to
define the “enemy” in contemporary politics sees terrorism as a purely negative
force in an otherwise positive (economic) globalized world. In this response, the
excessiveness of violence takes on less importance than the negative and
catastrophic consequences of terrorism over and against an otherwise peaceful
and positive globalizing economy. For those who perpetuate this
characterization, terrorism often becomes equated with a struggle against
globalization. In such a view globalization equates with increased democracy
and financial stability for developing and developed world alike, creating a
sphere of security. External to this sphere of security resides a world plagued by
insecurity and chaos. The U.S. state department’s list of travel alerts and
8

warnings represents one way of envisioning the borders of these opposing
spheres. Such countries as Mali, Libya, Sudan, and Somalia come with a fair
number of warnings. The state department defines a travel warning occurring:
when we want you to consider very carefully whether you should go to a
country at all. Examples of reasons for issuing a Travel Warning might
include unstable government, civil war, ongoing intense crime or violence,
or frequent terrorist attacks. We want you to know the risks of traveling
to these places and to strongly consider not going to them at all. Travel
Warnings remain in place until the situation changes; some have been in
effect for years.
11

For the proponents of this characterization, the basic formula works
around ideas of destabilization. The securitized world of global capital
represents stability, while those areas, often associated with terrorism, represent
a fundamental instability. The value of stability over instability would appear as
natural, and the two are mutually exclusive.
The second characterization asserts that terrorism has become so
important, and the dominant form of the enemy at this point in history, due to
the extreme and perverse level of violence terrorists employ as their primary
method. Of course, no one sees terrorists as merely violent, but the level of
violence represents something special in the world today. For example, in 2015
during the rise of the “Knife Infitada,” John Kirby, a representative of the Obama
administration, made statements indicating that Israel, in response to the
Palestinian violence, was possibly engaging in terrorist activities. The primary
determining factor in referring to these activities as terrorism revolved around

“State Department Travel Warnings,”
https://travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings.html
11

9

the excessive violence Israel employed. The excessiveness of violence brings
12

about a visceral reality for individual citizens, not only fearful for their security
but fearful of a peculiar type of security that terrorism threatens. Of course,
criminality is violent, but the distinguishing characteristics of a criminal act
hinges on a legal definition of those acts. Terrorism, on the other hand, while
certainly illegal in nature, does not take meaning from its illegality but by the
visceral and raw reality of something excessively violent in nature. The
importance, the threat, and the visibility of terrorism arises out of its excessively
violent nature.
Finally, a third provocative but haphazard approach characterizes the
prominence of terrorism as a mismanaged type of religious fervor. This view
relies on a dichotomous vision of society whereby the public and private are two
separate and distinct spheres of social life. Terrorism, for those who espouse this
type of response, represents a failure of the demarcation of these spheres; citing a
violation of the public sphere by something that should, if functioning correctly,
remain within the private sphere. This view largely relies on traditional ideas of
secularism and as such the religious has a certain place in society that terrorism
fundamentally usurps, the attention given to terrorism is not the consequence of
violence exactly, but rather as a consequence of religion that functions in
irreligious ways.

Kelan Howell, “Obama Administration Accuses Israel of Terrorism, ‘Excessive
Force,’” in The Washington Time, October 15, 2015, accessed April 16 , 2015.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/oct/15/obama-admin-accusesisrael-terrorism-excessive-for/
10
12

th

These characterizations and ways of thinking provide examples of the
social, legal, and political regulations surrounding terrorism. Only by taking
these answers seriously, even if they are haphazard, and investigating their
regulative function in the ongoing study of terrorism, can one begin to unpack
the formative biopolitical concepts that undergird and support such answers.
They do not arise on their own, as formed ahistorical ideas of enemy making.
These answers serve to describe and make real the contemporary enemy, and
since they serve to the make the enemy real, they rely on various rules and
philosophical claims founded on an insistence of life as the primary object and
mode of contemporary politics.
Such haphazard characterizations of the contemporary enemy do two
things. First, it maintains simplicity where nuance and complication are
necessary. Second, such answers obscure the root biopolitical ideas supporting
and maintaining their claim to truth. The functional and strategic value of such
answers lies in their apparent common sense. Of course terrorism relies on
violence. Of course terrorism is destabilizing. Of course terrorists often invoke
religious ideas and tropes. However, reducing the activity down to one of these
three haphazard answers covers over a series of interconnected ideas in
circulation that make such common sense so common. They provide the
appearance of being natural, while obscuring the very biopolitical discursive
foundations of truth making that makes something appear instinctive.
To uncover “the how” of terrorism rising to such political prominence one
must engage in a “genealogical” study of terrorism itself. Michel Foucault, in an

11

interview in 1978, described this genealogical approach to punishment in the
following way,
In order to get a better understanding of what is punished and why, I
wanted to ask the question how does one punish. This was the same
procedure as I had used when dealing with madness: rather than asking
what, in a given period, is regarded as sanity or insanity, as mental illness
or normal behavior, I wanted to ask how these division are effected. It’s a
method that seems to me to yield – I wouldn’t say the maximum of
possible illumination – at least a fairly fruitful kind of intelligibility.
13

In accordance with this description I am attempting to answer a question
of what makes something “terrorizing.” The larger implication of this strategy
insists terrorism, as a particular set of events, remain as events. By this insistence
on the “eventization” of particular occurrences, Foucault keeps these things as
discontinuous moments, not subject to larger metahistorical movements that
reduce the particulars into overarching patterns of the movements of history.

14

Each of the three ways of understanding terror - as repulsively violent, as
purely negative, and as excessively religious, insist on understanding terrorism
within the scope and framework of larger historical continuities. The first
envisions a history whereby people are becoming less violent over time. Society,
within this framework of historical continuity, sees violence as a harbinger of
earlier points in historical progress, where violence was a medium by which
disputes could be resolved, and has since gone away in favor of political options
for resolving such disputes. History moves us to a less violent situation. The

Michel Foucault, “Question on Method,” in The Essential Foucault, (New York:
The New Press, 2003) 247.
13

14

Ibid., 250.
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problem, as I will point out, is not so much that violence has been reduced but
rather the nature and “look” of violence has transitioned under biopolitical
demands.
The second historical continuity insists that history naturally progresses
along a line of efficiency. Society demands usefulness, often measured within
economic means. Terrorism represents a force that seeks to destabilize and
undermine usefulness, and again points to an earlier time in history where
usefulness was not realized in the way it is today. Like the less violent process of
history, the usefulness concept of history envisions terrorism as a source of
frustration over against this process, and something to be dealt with so that
usefulness can again be realized.
The third continuity relies on an understanding of secularization through
the historical process of differentiation. The religious sphere and the political
sphere are slowly moving apart over the course of history. In this moving apart,
political activities become the dominant form of the public sphere, while
religious activities have come to reside in the private sphere. Terrorism then is
seen to rupture this slow differentiation, bringing back into the realm of the
public the private concerns of religion.
By evaluating these three common tropes in response to terrorism I am
attempting in many ways to restore the genealogical method to the question of
terrorism, and what prompts the experience of terror.
A series of intersections that are impossible to ignore between terrorism
and biopolitics lies at the heart of this approach. In the most forceful terms

13

possible, terrorism is that anomaly that calls into question the entire biopolitical
paradigm, in its fundamental inability to solve the problem.
The first chapter focuses on the religious and theological processes
embedded in biopolitics and biopower. Utilizing two thinkers, Michel Foucault
and Giorgio Agamben I map the historical and genealogical process by which
biopolitics and biopower dominate political discourse, rely on religious concepts,
and the ruptures that terrorism poses to these developments. This is not to
revert to the re-instantiation of terrorism into a metahistorical process whereby
biopolitics and terrorism somehow represent a culmination of larger historical
movements. Rather, my thesis insists that terrorism in its most contemporary
form cannot be understood apart from a primordial theological and political
insistence (and distinction) on life.
Foucault and Agamben are at the heart of this project. While much
scholarship has been spent to parse out the respective differences between the
two thinkers, this project focuses on the points in which they converge and speak
to each other. Some have accused Agamben of doing something completely
anathema to Foucault’s approach by highlighting his attempts to uncover
“origins” in the contemporary political situation through a turn to theological
discourse. It is not that I am overtly opposed to such criticisms as much as these
criticisms simply do not matter for what I am doing here. I also believe they fail
to consider Agamben’s own comments on methodology, and I show the points of
similarity to Foucault’s concepts of genealogy throughout this first chapter,
focusing on convergence rather than divergence, namely Foucault’s shared

14

reliance on religious concepts to articulate his version of biopolitics and
biopower.
In the second and third chapters I explore the three haphazard answers
given to explain the rise in ideological prominence of terrorism, with a critical
investigation to each of these answers: repulsive violence, hyperinstrumentalization, and excessive religiosity. I critically exam each of the three
answers commonly provided to explain the rise of terrorism as a political
category. Finally, I will engage in a new line of inquiry that questions terrorism
outside the boundaries of mere political categories, paying attention to the
religious elements of biopolitics, and thereby envision terrorism within the
framework of the religious category of heresy.
My general methodology relies on two related philosophical concepts:
genealogy, and biopower/biopolitics. However, I first want to make clear what I
am not doing. This is not only a necessity from a theoretical perspective, but also
politically necessary. The weight with which people use the word “terrorism”
demands an apology for introducing it again under a very particular set of
circumstances. I do not intend to offer a definition of terrorism. I do not intend
to offer yet another political, military, or religious solution to the problems of
terrorism. Likewise, I do not defend the use of terrorism or violence for political
or religious ends, yet I simultaneously recognize that violence appears in a
myriad of forms with different uses in different contexts. Most importantly I am
not trying to locate a political, psychological, social, economic, or religious
justification for terrorism. Any attempts to answer the previous questions would
run counter to a genealogical project in their attempt to locate an origin or
15

essence of terrorism, something I am intentionally avoiding. Such an attempt at
locating the origins of terrorism would ultimately be, in Foucault’s words, “an
attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and their
carefully protected identities; because this search assumed the existence of
immobile forms that precede the external world of accident and succession.”

15

I am merely looking at one instance, one moment in a longer genealogical
study of the enemy itself. The enemy does not arrive from some original
primordial confrontation of the other. Rather the enemy, and enemy making,
takes place through a series of accidental encounters between different peoples at
different times. The current form of the enemy for biopolitical states appears as
terrorism, but this enemy could have easily been some other figure. Terrorism,
while having a certain level of connection to prior enemies ranging from the
Cold War to the more abstract War on Drugs, also possesses unique elements
that require special and articulation. Terrorism does not merely repeat history
with a new shape. A proper genealogy recognizes these similarities but likewise
insists on following the differences and tracing the differences that have arisen.

16

The haphazard characteristics given to terrorism as excessively violent,
economically negative, and inappropriately religious rely on the repetition of a
past and stable history, an insistence on “original” thinking regarding the enemy.
By exploring each of these haphazard characterizations in depth I attempt not
only to dislodge such “original” thinking, I also show the differences and errors

15

Michel Foucault, “Nietszche, Genealogy, History” in The Essential Foucault, 353.

16

Ibid., 355.
16

that each produce in the search for the truth of terrorism. Or, again, in Foucault’s
words:
The search for descent is not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary,
it disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what
was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined
consistent with itself.
17

This defines my precise goal in approaching terrorism, to take those
characteristics often provided as the truth of terror – the violent element, the
economically negative element, and the religious element – and disturb the
immobility of these common-sense explanations. Finally, I show how the reality
of these common sense approaches to terrorism lies not in merely covering over
the fundamental architecture of the truth of biopolitics, but how each truth
betrays a series of anomalies embedded in the fabric of biopolitics itself. In
summation, this project argues that articulating terrorism as a problem for
biopolitics rather than a problem of biopolitics produces a serious paradoxical
effect in contemporary politics.

17

Ibid., 356.
17

Chapter One: Biopolitics A Religious Concept

Biopolitics, generally the politicization of abstract life, as with any
theoretical concept has its own historical development and exists in different
forms for different thinkers. One could potentially trace this historical
development in several different ways, arriving at varied constructions of the
term that focus on phenomena within the social and political world. Deciding
then to focus upon Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben above others may
seem arbitrary. However, Foucault and Agamben provide convincing accounts
of the political realm in relation to the contemporary issue of terrorism.
Biopolitics for Foucault is not synonymous with biopolitics for Agamben, but
some important similarities exist between the two, namely the theological and
religious dimension present in each. Consequently, the decision to focus upon
these two thinkers reduces and diminishes other voices systematically utilizing
biopolitics to describe and assess politics. However, as I will show, some of these
voices miss the religious dimension present in both Foucault and Agamben. The
Theological Dimensions of Agamben’s Biopolitics:

18

The Theological Dimensions of Agamben’s Biopolitics

I begin with Agamben, due to his contributions appearing the most
overtly religious and thereby setting the stage for the comparison between the
two thinkers at the center of this project. His most deliberate work on the topic
of biopolitics comes from the first two volumes of his Homo Sacer series, which
spans over 9 volumes written over 21 years and concluding in 2016. Within both
Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life and The State of Exception, Agamben
develops an illuminating account of biopolitics derived from multiple sources
throughout the history of western thought and philosophy. An account of three
of these figures provides a helpful explanation of the religious elements bound
up in Agamben’s biopolitics: Aristotle, Carl Schmitt, and Georges Bataille.
One cannot discount the influence Aristotle has over political philosophy.
In many ways, outside of the Republic, Aristotle serves as the very root of the
entire branch of philosophy focusing upon politics and the organization of
people. This ability to organize and form political unions resides definitively in
human linguistic capabilities. Humans alone use language, and because of this
ability, can engage in self-examination. By examining ourselves we uncover our
1

fundamental weakness and fragility, particularly in isolation. As a result, we
form partnerships, and in turn further develop these into increasingly complex
arrangements. In 1.2 of the Politics, Aristotle traces these partnerships from the

1
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foundational male and female to the formation of the family, the combining of
families into a village, and finally several villages into a city.
The larger and more complex the social associations, the more they
demand the use of language, and as a result the biological reality of our fragility
in isolation becomes increasingly opaque. In the formative stage of our
partnerships, survival is more precarious and more biologically immediate. The
biological threat to our survival coupled with the realities of procreation demand
relationships and partnerships with others. Second, more socially complex
associations and partnerships require language to name things as evil and good,
just and unjust. The ability to make partnerships and agree together on the
2

nature of those partnerships requires the establishing of rules through language.
Aristotle goes so far as to compare the city to a body, arguing for its
prominence among associations, showing that without the body, intact and
entire, there would be no need for the individual arm. Similarly, the family (the
“arm”) must take secondary status to the larger more necessary collection of the
whole (the body) in the city. This city likewise offers a diverse skillset among the
members. Each person serves a different role, some farming and others making
pots. But bringing together such diverse talents, drives, desires, and fears
requires some mediating force that can decide on how these arrangements will
be made fair. Language enters as the means to make these decisions known and
shared by all who take part in the partnerships. Ideas like fairness, justice, crime,
citizenry, and so forth emerge from these primordial linguistic notions and
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demands. The political realm exists as a possibility due to the biological
precariousness of the human and the unique capability to put into words
demands and restrictions. Language uniquely belongs to the human, and the use
of language defines the human in comparison to other creatures. The more we
use language, the more unlike other animals we become. The polis as a refuge
from the threats of nature exists because of language, and language as a
definitive marker for humankind pushes us further into the polis and away from
nature. The human only comes about in the city because the city only comes
about from language, and engaging in language most makes us human.
Giorgio Agamben highlights a paradox arising out of this unique
relationship of language to the city. In overcoming our biological reality and
pushing away the dangers of nature we rely upon language. Language takes us
further and further away from the threats of the natural world and the internal
biological reality of our own animality. As we speak we become less and less
like the wolf. We are in the process of excluding the animal, the biological
element, through using language and the subsequent development of the
political. We of course know we are still animals and biological, subject to the
same existential fate of all the other animals. As much as we are unique through
our use of language, we are still the same living things that will one day die. We
take this linguistic capability and make partnerships to protect ourselves against
this existential threat. The paradox can be summarized in this way the more
political we become the more we push out the biological, yet the biological is
what pushed us to become political in the first place.

21

The animal part of us, the part subject to the grip of death, motivates
humans to develop language, the most un-animal part of us. The paradox lies
here, in the way we construct and imagine the remaining animal portion. The
fear and terror bound up in that animal part pushes us to further distance
ourselves from that biological reality in attempts to postpone death for as long as
possible. Politics serves this purpose from its very outset, and continues into the
contemporary situation. The biological and visceral reality of death forces
politics to focus upon life and its preservation. The uniqueness in our ability to
use language always ends up linking our politics back to the fundamental
negativity of death.

3

But this part of us, the included/excluded animal and biological part,
retreats from the power of language. Because the passage into language
4

represents such a fundamental distinction between ourselves and animals we
articulate the primordial biological reality Agamben calls “Bare Life.” Or put
more simply, experiencing the world through language makes it impossible to
cognitively apprehend a situation prior to language. Bare life resists language
because bare life exists completely and entirely outside of the political sphere, or
prior to all political arrangements, generating a crisis within a political system
which makes its foundation in the very unspeakable reality of biology and bare
life. Agamben distinguishes between a certain type of political life and bare life

Giorgio Agamben, Language and Death: The Place of Negativity, trans. Karen
Pinkus and Michael Hardt (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991),
xi-xii.
3

Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans. Daniel Heller
Roazan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 18.
22
4

through the Greek terms bios and zoê. Bios entails a certain kind of life,
particularized and manifested in certain forms, while zoê indicates life devoid of
specificity, abstract and bare.
One representation of this crisis is sovereignty and its expression through
the regulation of the law. Agamben relies heavily on Carl Schmitt’s assertion
that the sovereign only appears as sovereign when it decides upon the exception.
In certain moments and during certain events the law itself, and the entirety of
the legal order, can come under threat through some internal or external force.
During normal circumstances the law maintains strict regulation of the polis, but
during these exceptional moments where the threat increases to such severity,
normal procedures cannot be maintained. That which can declare the exception
to the normal progression of rule and order is the sovereign. Because of this
ability to suspend the law the sovereign always exists in relation to the law as
simultaneously inside and outside. In the right situation, the sovereign steps
beyond the legal order, and it is through this stepping beyond the legal order the
sovereign appears as sovereignty.

5

In the normal situation citizens are defined as citizens through a legal
proscription. The status of citizens designates a series of legal claims and orders
(a form of life, bios). Citizenship though, unlike other legal proclamations,
bounds the very availability and possibility of the law to that individual. There
can be no legal recognition without the primacy of citizenship bestowed upon
the individual. Though this bestowal of identity can be suspended, by sovereign
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decision, returning the individual back to a situation of bare life (zoê) prior to
those political partnerships defined and outlined by Aristotle. The citizen can
only have recourse to the protection of the law if they are citizens, recognized by
the law as such, and if they are denied citizenship all legal processes cease to be
meaningful for them. Like the sovereign, those reduced to this status of bare life
are simultaneously included and excluded from the legal order.
The figure of the homo sacer represents, as a paradigmatic form, this
inclusion and exclusion in relation to the law, and reduction to bare life. This
figure can be killed without being murdered, and, in addition, they cannot die in
a sacrificial manner. The second part retains as much importance as the first,
especially in an analysis of Agamben that focuses upon the religious dimensions
of biopolitics. To be killed without being murdered makes the death of the homo
6

sacer possible, but if one were to kill him or her such an act would not be
considered legally as murder. Murder entails a crime with serious legal
ramifications and consequences; a murderer violates the state’s basic and
primary monopoly on violence. However, as the legal order excludes the homo
sacer as a non-political figure without any legal protections, prior to all politics,
the killing of that individual does not violate the state’s prerogative to protect its
citizens from the violence of others because the homo sacer thoroughly and
fundamentally lacks citizenship and inclusion in the state, having been reduced
to bare life.

6
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The second part of the definition of the Homo Sacer claims an inability to
be subject to a ritual sacrifice, and it requires a bit more explanation and some
analysis of Agamben’s reading of George Bataille. Agamben initially seems to
discount Bataille’s contribution to the subject, accusing him of relying too heavily
on fear and respect of the sacred in his work. However, Bataille’s concept of the
7

intimacy of animality has remarkable similarities to Agamben’s distinction
8

between zoê and bios. Bataille poetically envisions the experience of the animal
eating another animal and the shocking intimacy between the two, one animal
not recognizing the distinction between itself and the thing it eats. The most
9

profound human action for Bataille is recognition and division, namely between
the human self and other things external to the human. The ability to speak and
name the things around us as different from us and different from other things
completely contradicts the animal’s vision of the world as radically
undifferentiated. Language enters here as an important element in the endeavor
to divide the world of things up, naming each to set it apart from others. We of
course can only vaguely and inexactly imagine this animal way of envisioning
the world because such a return to pre-linguistic and pre-political ways of
thinking remains inaccessible to the political and linguistic human. However,
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Bataille views the law not as progress of the good, bringing about a harmonious
society, but instead the law merely establishes and maintains the order of things.

10

Bataille offers a theory that places this animal intimacy in close contact
with the sacred realm. This animal existence, completely foreign to the political
human, and like the sacred realm with an ambivalent quality, vacillates between
something demanding profound respect while also being a tremendous source of
horror. The threat and respect element of the sacred realm, and similarly the
11

animal realm, makes us more and more comfortable with the order the profane
realm offers, a realm we can order ourselves and therefore control. That
animal/sacred realm reminds us, as does bare life, that we are still natural living
things and as a result are subject to death. The distinction between the profane
and sacred realms is a distinction between the realm of ordered life and the
realm of death.
We can offer sacrifices to this other realm of the sacred, but we can only
sacrifice out of the realm we control and have given meaning over. The things
we control, name, and distinguish are those things which are available to
sacrifice and hand over to the realm of undifferentiated. We only name and
identify as unique those things which are useful to us and as a result useful
things are made available for sacrificing. Ritual sacrifice serves as the process by
which some object or thing is brought forth out of the realm of mere things and
transported into the sacred realm. The sacrifice extends beyond the object and
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offers the removal, if only for a moment, of those who offered up the sacrifice out
of the profane realm as well. As Bataille explains, “The first fruits of the harvest
or the head of livestock are sacrificed in order to remove the plant and animal,
together with the farmer and the stock raisers, from the world of things.”

12

Sacrifice removes all usefulness of the thing or object. For example, an animal
sacrificed in a ritualized manner does not in turn serve as food. Killing an
animal for food involves a different process with differing ritualistic overtones
than killing an animal for sacrifice. The death of the animal and refusal then to
eat the animal results in a rearrangement of the instrumental value of the thing
sacrificed. Bataille writes of the one who offers up the sacrifice in the following
way:
Intimately, I belong to the sovereign world of gods and myths, to the
world of violent and uncalculated generosity, just as my wife belongs to
my desires. I withdraw you, victim, from the world in which you were
and could only be reduced to the condition of a thing, having a meaning
that was foreign to your intimate nature. I call you back to the intimacy of
the divine world, of the profound immanence of all that is.
13

This consequence of the sacrifice brings about a community of people through
the festival surrounding that sacrifice. People remain faithful to the sacrifice by
returning to the world of things, using and sharing those things and ordering the
profane realm. The sacrifice serves as the political center of the community,
bringing people together and binding them in communion through the sacrificial
act.
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This sacrifice and setting something apart from the regular mundane
order of things, allows for the perpetual continuation of that very order. This
concept shares remarkable similarity to the paradox at the center of Agamben’s
reading of Aristotle and the metaphysical ordering of the political Agamben
unpacks. The homo sacer in its inability to be sacrificed carries the connotation of
the sacrifice being part of the foundations of the communal and political
possibility of the legal order itself.
The sacrifice does not merely bring the community together through the
festival, but a series of prohibitions around the sacrifice and its ordering forms
the fabric of the legal order through historical development. Bataille argues that
a process emerges within the logic of sacrifice moving from the sacrifice of
human slaves to an eventual moral prohibition against human sacrifice.
Eventually, religious and theological solutions were proposed whereby God, in
his ultimate goodness and nobility, would maintain the order of things on behalf
of humanity. Of course, this God maintaining the order makes itself useful and
instrumental, and consequently subject to the possibility of sacrifice. The
Christian culmination and fulfillment of this process has God sacrificed and
through the sacrifice establishes a stable divine realm where intimacy can be
recovered in a purified form (bodies that will not age).
The homo sacer cannot be sacrificed because the homo sacer has no place in
the general order of things, and their death then cannot be made meaningful
because of the profound non-meaning embedded in its identity. It is a figure
beyond meaning and outside of the order of meaning, serving as a limit point
and return to the intimate animality, in the words of Bataille, or the pre-linguistic
28

and pre-political zoê in Agamben. They come to form a politics of the prepolitical situation, or more directly it comes to form biopolitics.
Unlike Bataille, who renders this pre-political intimate animal inaccessible
to the human, Agamben retains accessibility of this reduction to bare life through
biopolitics. In the sacrifice, the complete reduction of all instrumental value
brings the thing out of the world of things into the divine and intimate realm, but
Agamben maintains some connection between the internal political sphere and
the external pre-political/biopolitical sphere. The reduction of bare life does not
occur in an instant, but the political order maintains the expulsion from the legal
order. This tension between the internal and external, central to Agamben, only
plays out in Bataille through the tension inside the divine realm, the threshold
between horror and respect demanded by the sacred. But for Agamben the
threshold and tension gets bound up in the figure of the homo sacer.

14

The inability to murder the homo sacer shows the tension in the legal and
juridical exception of the homo sacer, related to the exclusion of the sovereign
through the decisive act of the exception to the legal order. Both the sovereign
15

and the homo sacer stand inside and outside the law simultaneously. Even
constitutional law, which at a cursory glance appears rather distinct from classic
models of sovereignty expressed in one monarchic individual, retains this ability
to suspend the law itself. Agamben shows how constitutional orders still contain
some element of potential suspension of the constitutionally defined legal order
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for the sake of protecting said constitution. The suspension of the law still
16

includes the law as a decisively excluded juridical order, likewise the homo sacer
maintains some connection to the interior political system through its exclusion
from that juridical order. The sovereign and the homo sacer both reside in a zone
of indistinction relative to the interior and exterior of the juridical order. They
are both included through their exclusion.
However, the homo sacer does not remain merely political, as it takes on a
religious dimension when connected to the idea of sacrifice through Bataille. It
simultaneously cannot be sacrificed and therefore enter a divine economy and
spiritual redemption through being put to death, and the death of the homo sacer
cannot act as a foundational act of community making. Sacrifice, for Bataille,
always has instrumentality as its goal and condition. The usefulness of the
sacrificed thing allows for the availability of sacrifice for the thing. Sacrificial
logic transcends the world of thingness. Biopolitics, in its examination of the
sacrificial element, thoroughly invests the concept not only with juridical and
legal meaning, but religious as well. Biopolitics for Agamben, through his
reading of Bataille, is a thoroughly religious concept made political, particularly
in the presence of the “camp.”
The camp most viscerally exposes this internal and external tension. For
Agamben the camp denotes both the classic tangible representation through the
horrors of places like Auschwitz, but it also denotes more abstract, divergent,
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and unexpected forms. In the camp, which lacks the strict boundary of the
17

nation state, bare life finds the height of its negative expression. Life reduced to
zoê, indistinguishable and lacking coherent identity, becomes the pure modern
and contemporary form of biopolitics. Life reduced in such a way enacts the
sovereign exclusion of life from the political sphere, simultaneous to the
construction of homo sacer, or that which can be killed without being murdered or
sacrificed.
The camp, like the homo sacer, serves as a paradigm for his biopolitical
project. Agamben articulates both his genealogical project of the biopolitical, the
homo sacer, and the camp, in addition to Foucault’s concepts of biopolitics and
biopower, by using the paradigm. He writes:
At this point, I think it is clear what it means to work by way of
paradigms for both me and Foucault. Homo sacer and the concentration
camp, the Muselmann and the state of exception, and, more recently, the
Trinitarian oikonomia and acclamations are not hypotheses through which
I intended to explain modernity by tracing it back to something like a
cause or historical origin. On the contrary, as their very multiplicity might
have signaled, each time it was a matter of paradigms whose aim was to
make intelligible series of phenomena whose kinship had eluded or could
elude the historian’s gaze. To be sure, my investigations, like those of
Foucault, have an archeological character, and the phenomena with which
they deal unfold across time and therefore require an attention to
documents and diachrony that cannot but follow the laws of historical
philology…Archaeology, then, is always a paradigmatology, and the
capacity to recognize and articulate paradigms defines the rank of the
inquirer no less than does his or her ability to examine the documents of
an archive.
18

There are six elements to the paradigm within the work of Agamben:
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1.

A paradigm is a form of knowledge that is neither inductive nor
deductive but analogical. It moves from singularity to singularity.

2. By neutralizing the dichotomy between the general and the particular,
it replaces dichotomous logic with a bipolar analogical model.
3. The paradigmatic case becomes such by suspending and, at the same
time, exposing its belonging to the group, so that it is never possible to
separate its exemplarity from its singularity.
4. The paradigmatic group is never presupposed by the paradigms;
rather, it is immanent in them.
5. In the paradigm, there is no origin or arche; every phenomenon is the
origin, every image archaic.
6. The historicity of the paradigm lies neither in diachrony nor in
synchrony but in a crossing of the two.
Paradigms and paradigm shifts are most often associated with the work of
Thomas Kuhn, someone Agamben cites regularly in his own description of
paradigmatic thinking. Though unlike Kuhn, Agamben does not articulate a
robust explanation of the way paradigm shifts occur in thought. Instead, he
focuses on the presence of singularities in paradigmatic thinking, and how these
singularities remain attached to other singularities, as the paradigm is not a
meta-concept outside of singular expression.
This conversation of the paradigm provides important context for
understanding the way the camp, the sovereign, and the homo sacer are
simultaneously theological and political concepts. Returning for a moment to
Carl Schmitt, the statement that all contemporary political concepts are
32

secularized theological concepts begins to make sense in Agamben’s work when
thought through the paradigm. Taking seriously the use of paradigm provides
some explanation for the way Agamben sees this shift from the theological to the
political evident in Schmitt’s writing. The switch from a religious epoch (with its
own paradigm) to a secular epoch (with its own paradigm) does not provide a
fundamental break between the two, but a shift in the singularities within each.
Through time and different divergent modes of thinking the religious categories
transition away from overt religious actions, such as sacrifice, into political and
juridical activities. The epochs are not thoroughly, finally, or radically separate
from each other but rather different singular instances of the same fundamental
structures of order, law, and the maintenance of the polis. Foucault does
something similar, though does not use the language of paradigm, and rather
than focusing upon categories of sacrifice he focuses on the pastoral element
within biopolitics, yet like Agamben still retaining a thoroughly religious
condition.

The Theological and Religious Dimensions of Foucault’s Biopolitics

Scholarship on Foucualt’s concept of biopolitics tends to focus almost
exclusively on the political processes moving power structures between what he
describes as a discipline society and a security society. While an important
transition within Foucault’s biopolitics, such scholarship often foregoes the
religious dimension in Foucault’s work. Some remedy to this diminishing of the
religious material is in order, though still beginning with the discipline society.
33

In Discipline and Punish Foucault articulates the way in which
society attempts to procure peaceful relationships between individuals, but does
so through covert military-like organizational systems. The institutions in
society aim to produce peaceful citizenry through processes of segmenting
individuals into groups, enclosing spaces, partitioning of people, ranking and
creating hierarchies within the social order, and the serializing of individuals.
These processes are rooted in militarized practices and forms of organization that
seek to make effective soldiers.

19

Other institutions beyond the military reproduce these practices in their
own structures and activities. The school utilizes a series of hierarchies in the
20

form of grades, and encloses students within individual classrooms and desks,
measuring them through a complex system of grading. Another example would
21

be the regimenting of daily activities of patients by hospitals, along with charting
and serializing a complex nexus of patient information, and enclosing the sick in
segmented areas of the hospital.
Foucault describes the ways in which the human body comes under
disciplines so that, in the end, the human will discipline themselves in
accordance with the larger structural goals of the society. The schools, clinics,
and most notably prisons serve the function of providing a model to the
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individual that they can then take into their life and carry out similar
regimentations.
This theme of disciplining the body gets taken up in Foucault’s later work
The History of Sexuality and the recently translated series of lectures Society Must
be Defended. However, in these writings, the militarization strategy, endemic to
the discipline society, changes its intended focus from the individual body to the
body politic. Foucault develops an acute awareness of the way in which the
population can come to look and appear strikingly like an individual body. As
such, the same militarized technologies that work so efficiently at regimenting
the individual, also regiment and mobilize a larger population. Like an
individualized body, a larger population produces spontaneous needs and
desires, and technologies could develop to calculate, control, and manage this
larger body composed of individual bodies.
Central to the process of discipline, management and segmentation
strategies functionally correct, control, and mobilize the larger populous. This
22

shift of focus from the individual body to the larger population does not erase
the internal militarized machinations within disciplining the individual. The
goal of the military strategies Foucault originally introduced sought to make a
good soldier. If the institutions provide proper disciplining structures then
individuals could reproduce the desired behaviors without the oversight of the
institution, effectively becoming a better soldier. Similar strategies applied to a
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larger population produce docility at the macro level, making it possible to raise
an entire population to wage war against any threat.

23

The war a population makes appears as notably different from other wars,
in that a population does not fight over traditional issues such as territorial
disputes. Motivating an entire population, civilians included, requires a
different set of criteria. Julian Reed astutely observes:
In the earlier text Foucault understands war exerting an influence
indirectly via the influence of tactical models of military organization as a
kind of projected social schema for the creation of a logistical order among
an otherwise disordered multitude. In the History of Sexuality,
alternatively, Foucault starts to develop an argument as the ways in which
war invests the order of political power as a kind of immanent force. The
influence of war upon society does not refer simply to the discrete
influence of an institutionalized military and its bodies of tactical
knowledge, but to the ‘multiplicity of force relations immanent in the
sphere in which they operate and in which constitute their organizations.’
Here Foucault is developing a conception of war as the source of specific
forms of force relations that are constitutive of power relations. War is the
source that accounts for the forms of life that generate power relations
rather than being the source influenced by proxy through military
institutions and discourses with wield power over the life of individual
bodies.
24

This development of war, highlighted by Reed, serves as the formal distinction
between the concepts of “strategy” and “tactic.” Disciplinary power focuses
exclusively on tactics that divide and individualize bodies towards docility and
efficiency. Strategies, on the other hand, taken up in biopolitical regimes seek to
combine and bring together, defining forms of life in the process and creating a
sense of belonging and identity. This sense of belonging does not merely
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provide a place for the individual at the level of community, but instead gives
the individual a sense that they belong to the whole of humanity.

25

Enacting power over the population has certain consequences. Most
pressing of these consequences is the possibility that some forms of life simply
will not fit or comply with the goals and dynamics of a given population. In the
later lectures of Society Must be Defended Foucault introduces this issue within the
context of a new form of racism founded on the distinction between worthy and
unworthy forms of life. This form of racism, notably different from previous
26

iterations that focused upon ethnic boundaries between groups, determines that
certain forms of life threaten the extinction of the abstract body of living
individuals. Divergent lifeforms potentially cause such profound
destabilizations for the population, and in turn the entirety of the human-race,
that they simply cannot be tolerated. Biopolitics determines which lives can be
understood and defined, while simultaneously translating ethnic differentiation
into biological racism. As a result, populations wage war on behalf of the
species.

27

Racism, and the resulting novel forms of war, changes the scope and
nature of violence. Rather than utilizing violence for tactical goals, whereby
contested territories may be won and controlled, this new form of violence seeks
to eradicate entire groups of humans that present a possible threat to the larger
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continuation and preservation of life. The goals of violence shift in accordance
with these changing perspectives of life and its protection.
[E]nemies who have to be done away with are not adversaries in the
political sense of the term; they are threats, either external or internal, to
the population and for the population. In the biopower system, in other
words, killing of the imperative to kill is acceptable only if it results not in
a victory over political adversaries, but in the elimination of the biological
threat to and the improvement of the species or race.
28

In the same way that Agamben describes the homo sacer as both a political and
juridical figure as well as a religious one (that which cannot be sacrificed),
Foucault likewise develops the concept of biopolitics and violence through both
a juridical and religious perspective. Protecting the species does come about on
its own, but follows a religious and theological pattern of thought bound to the
pastorate. This pastorate has roots in both the Hebraic pre-Christian east, and
then further developments in Christianity. Foucault articulates the pastorate
29

through the analogy of the shepherd overseeing a flock of sheep. He writes:
The shepherd’s power is not exercised over territory but, by definition,
over a flock, and more exactly, over the flock in its movement from one
place to another. The shepherd’s power is essentially exercised over a
multiplicity in movement. The Greek god is a territorial god, a god intra
muros, with his privileged place, his town or temple. The Hebrew God, on
the other hand, is the God moving from place to place, the God who
wanders.
30

Foucault contrasts the power of the Greek gods to the Hebrew
monotheistic God. The Greek idea of a god prioritizes sovereignty above all else,
particularly sovereignty over stationary and clearly defined territory. Territory
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defines the scope and reach of the divinity’s power, additionally, this power
cares little for what resides within the territory only for the territory itself.
Additionally, the Greek conception works as a negative force within that
territory, by removing threats and opposition, rather than acting as a positive
force guiding or instructing the individual inhabitants.

31

The Hebraic idea of God exercise power in a different way, reducing the
emphasis on the territory. Power in this form does not enact force over terrain,
but guides and instructs a group within the terrain. Unlike the Greek power of
the god, this Hebraic idea does not negatively remove threats, but practices a
benevolent and positive management of the group within. The form of power in
this model is, “entirely defined by its beneficence; its only raise d’etre is doing
good. In fact, the essential objective of pastoral power is the salvation of the
flock.”

32

Elsewhere, Foucault provides a series of qualities that further define the
form of power bound up in the shepherd and flock relationship. Continuing the
theme of a power that oversees a group as opposed to a territory, this power
brings together and leads the flock to salvation. Through bringing together a
divergent group into harmonious union, this notion of power does something
more than merely protect against threats and hostilities. In addition, the
shepherd provides a means of salvation for the flock. Everyone within the flock
falls under the care of the shepherd, who meets their individual needs. Finally,
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Foucault describes the shepherd’s connection to duty, who as leader of the group
has a duty and role of service to the individuals that make up that group.
Because of duty, the leader continuously keeps watch over the flock, ensuring
everyone’s perpetual safety and prosperity, not to the benefit of the shepherd but
for the individuals within the flock.

33

The Hebraic notions of power are not isolated, and exist in other cultures,
religions, and regions. By looking specifically at Christianity, and how
Christians theologically develop and augment the shepherding model of power,
Foucault provides an analysis of how biopower and biopolitics have some
important religious and theological elements. He provides an analysis of the
Christian development of power in four forms.
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First, Christianity expands the salvific responsibility of the shepherd. The
level, depth, and complexity of responsibility greatly increases, moving from a
generalized well-being to an overt account of the actions of everyone. Foucault
describes this deepened responsibility: “In the Christian conception, the
shepherd must render an account – not only of each sheep, but of all their
actions, all the good or evil they are liable to do, all that happens to them.” The
35

ability to manage and account for each individual sin and good deed committed
by the members of the group expresses the success or failure of the shepherd of
that group.

Michel Foucault, “Omnes et Singulatim” in Power: The Essential Works of Foucault
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Second, the Christianization of the shepherd model of power entails a
stronger allegiance between the flock and the shepherd. The flock does not
merely benefit from the power of the shepherd, their entire well-being
thoroughly depends on the shepherd. The relationship involves deep
dependence and reliance on the shepherd and, as Foucault describes:
In Christianity, the tie with the shepherd is an individual one. It is
personal submission to him. His will is done, not because it is consistent
with the law, and not just as far as it is consistent with it, but, principally,
because it is his will.
36

Third, a certain form of knowledge arises out of the Christian concept of
pastoral power connecting the increased responsibility of the shepherd over the
flock with an increased accumulation of knowledge through accounting for the
actions of everyone. These actions, deeds, thoughts, sins, and inclinations must
be tracked, tabulated, and recorded. To meet this goal the pastoral power
develops the confessional, whereby members of the flock render an account of
their activities to the shepherd as part of their devotion.
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Fourth, while the responsibility of the shepherd extends to the entirety of
the flock, individuals can only attain salvation on their own behalf. The
shepherd, while ultimately responsible for the flock, cannot in isolation bring
anyone to salvation, as individuals pursue this on their own behalf. Foucault
describes this process as a “mortification in this world. Mortification is not
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death, of course, but it is a renunciation of this world and of oneself, a kind of
everyday death – a death that is supposed to provide life in another world.”
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The development of this analysis of pastoral power has strong and
formative connections to the specifics of biopolitics in Foucault’s larger body of
theoretical work. This model of power, in conjunction with the Greek emphasis
on the city and sacrifice on behalf of the city, comes to model conceptions of
legitimate use of political power. Foucault connects this to modern politics:
We can say that the Christian pastorship has introduced a game that
neither the Greeks nor the Hebrews imagined. It is a strange game whose
elements are life, death, truth, obedience, individuals, self-identity – a
game that seems to have nothing to do with the game of the city surviving
through the sacrifice of citizens. Our societies proved to be really demonic
since they happened to combine those two games – the city-citizen games
and the shepherd-flock game – in what we call the modern states.
39

Both Agamben and Foucault share a conviction that underneath or in connection
to our modern secularized political systems, theological elements exist. Modern
forms of government and the instrumental utilization of political power does not
come about in isolation, but instead follows a lengthy path of theological and
religious development and influence. Obviously, overt forms of political power
relying on theological and religious language wanes; however, what remains
crucial for understanding the religious dimensions of biopolitics is the shared
insistence of underlying theological material that helps carry forward and give
structure to modern political projects.
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Nevertheless, there are distinguishing characteristics between Agamben
and Foucault. On the one hand, Agamben theoretically preserves the idea of the
sovereign as a critical entrance into understanding politics, while Foucault
overtly avoids sovereignty in articulating the contours of biopolitics. Foucault
makes this hesitancy and suspicion of sovereignty clear on several occasions:
Rather than looking at the three prerequisites of law, unity, and subject which make sovereignty both the source of power and the basis of
institutions - I think that we have to adopt the threefold point of view of
the techniques, the heterogeneity of techniques, and the subjugationeffects that make technologies of domination the real fabric of both power
relations and the great apparatuses of power. The manufacture of subjects
rather than the genesis of the sovereign: that is our general theme.
40

These distinctions are necessary for understanding the work of both Foucault
and Agamben in isolation; however, when it comes to the religious and
theological element, both share the idea that modern politics has some debt to
pay.
In summation, Agamben relies on the exclusion of bare life, while
Foucault centers on the way in which political discourse arises and comes to be
recognized as such. Both approaches provide a biopolitical analysis with special
attention to the religious dimensions involved. Both work together making
possible a unique analysis of modern politics, by first questioning the negative
assertion of bare life and creation of a politics through this exclusion, and then
through a series of ideas about what we become after such an exclusion occurs.
Further, while a hesitancy to approach sovereignty exists in Foucault, this
hesitancy is the consequence of sovereignty evolving, not disappearing.
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Sovereignty evolved beyond an essential connection with territory, delinked
from needing some established zone that it can exercise sovereignty over.
Agamben shares this evolution with Foucault, as he focuses less on the
relationship between territory and sovereignty, and instead on the nomos of the
“camp.” The camp in this form of exclusion plays a similar role in Agamben as
the concept of racism for Foucault. Both the camp and racism involve producing
a “we” over and against an unrecognizable (politically and biologically) other.
Finally, one further crucial connection between Foucault and Agamben
bears mentioning. By focusing on sacrifice in Agamben, we see the role
instrumentalization plays and the crisis signified through the sacrifice of abstract
life. I disagree with Foucault on one point, as he writes:
The theory of right basically knew only the individual and society: the
contracting individual and the social body constituted by the voluntary or
implicit contract among individuals. Disciplines, for their part, dealt with
individuals and their bodies in practical terms. What we are dealing with
in this new technology of power is not exactly society (or at least not the
social body, as defined by the jurists), nor is it the individual-as-body. It is
a new body, a multiple body, a body with so many heads that, while they
might not be infinite in number, cannot necessarily be counted. Biopolitics
deals with the population, with the population as a political problem, as a
problem that is at once scientific and political, as a biological problem and
as power's problem. And I think that biopolitics emerges at this time.
41

The focus on population is a result of biopolitics, not its beginning. Foucault
captures the reality of the contemporary situation quite well in his notions of
racism and war waged on behalf of life paradoxically relying on a more
fundamental capability of a military technologies that could potentially eradicate
all life. Due to the possibility of species annihilation a new politics that seeks to
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articulate and define what constitutes life and its subsequent management arises.
Understanding biopolitics from this perspective seems much more in conjunction
with Foucault’s often quoted remark, “For millennia, man remained what he was
for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence:
modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being
into question.”
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The capacity to eradicate life and sacrifice life opens the central
biopolitical moment and most immediate crisis. That which constitutes life
remains contested while the ability to eradicate life has actualized. A biopolitical
analysis must attend to this fundamental crisis – a crisis recognized and focused
upon by both Foucault and Agamben. In this crisis we can begin to detect the
unique problem which terrorism presents. The threat of terrorism forces the
related issues of exclusion and racism to the forefront precisely because terrorism
threatens life at such a profoundly deep level.

Other Uses of Biopolitics

The work of Michel Hardt and Antonio Negri, most notably in their
Empire trilogy, highlight concepts of biopolitics that dramatically diverge with
both Foucault and Agamben. Their work focuses prominently on means of
resisting current political formations, and situating biopower as a remedial force
against political stagnancy and rigidity within modernity. The movement from
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modernity to postmodernity signals profound and serious shifts in the language
of politics. With very few exceptions, modern politics articulates power as
formally bound to sovereignty that stands over and rules the social sphere.
Postmodernity breaks apart this notion of power as a transcendental force from
outside the social realm of lived experience.
One of these breaks between the modern and postmodern comes in the
form of labor. For the modern period, labor was instinctively conjoined with the
material production of things, objects, food, shelter, and other tangible artifacts.
The laborer would go to a factory or shop and manufacture a material product.
As a result, one could easily measure labor through the matrix of output and
profit. If a certain number of objects were made, profit would directly align with
the surplus value of each object produced beyond the costs of covering raw
materials. However, in new forms of economic production, work and labor have
evolved beyond the measurable production, distribution, and consumption of
particular objects, as work transitions into a socially encompassing process
whereby the products made are intricately attached to the “life” of the laborer.
Works shifts to encompass more than the factories and workshops and considers
more abstract ideas such as mental labor, personal labor, and relationships. As
new forms of labor arise, new forms of monetization simultaneously arise. As
Negri writes:
Today, ‘work’ refers to the entirety of social activity. In order to
understand this mutation we must keep in mind the struggles and
transformations of organization of labor since 1917, an insurrectional
challenge on the part of the workers that, for the long term (what some,
precisely, have labeled the ‘short century’), plunged the whole of
organized labor into crisis. The first response to the aggression of living
work towards the capitalist system took the form of the New Deal, and
then developed as the general spread of the welfare state in the central
46

regions of the planet, through the imposition of biopolitical forms of
organization and exploitation of both society and the state.
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Because of this radically new form of labor and production, resistance to such
deeply entrenched modes of production becomes infinitely more challenging.
Foucault, in his work, certainly attends to pressing matters of economic change,
however, for Hardt and Negri the economic aspects are central, and in many
ways exclusively the content of biopolitics.
Biopolitics arises in response to these new economic challenges. Whereas
biopolitics for Foucault primarily finds its impetus for action in the management
of populations, and thereby subsumes economics under this larger managerial
goal, for Hardt and Negri, biopolitics directly confronts the economic system,
providing a necessary resistance to the shifting and often debilitating realities of
a pervasive economic reality. In fact, Hard and Negri criticize Foucault for his
lack of available strategies for resisting this new form of politics. They remedy
this lack through introducing the concept of the “multitude.”
They derive this idea of the multitude from the work of Spinoza, Negri
writes:
Spinoza’s Political Treatise is the work that founds, in theoretical terms,
modern European democratic political thought. The assertion is a
rigorous one, one that in the first place rules out the generic reduction of
the modern idea of democracy, based on the concept of the multitude, to
the idea of democracy proper to ancient, specifically Greco-Latin, thought.
In Spinoza, the specific and immediate basis of the idea of democracy, and
even more so the concept of the multitude, is human universality. In the
democratic thought of the Ancients this is not given, the freedom is the
attribute of the citizens of the polis only. On this score Spinoza
distinguishes himself from the other democratic thinkers of his historical
Antonio Negri, The Porcelain Workshop: For A New Grammar of Politics, trans.
Noura Wedells (Los Angeles: Semiotext(e), 2008), 21.
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era: in other currents of modern democratic thought, the idea of
democracy is not in fact conceived in terms of the immediacy of political
expression, but rather it is defined in the form of the abstract transfer of
sovereignty and the alienation of natural right. On the contrary, the
revolutionary character of Spinoza’s political proposal consists in the
conjuncture of the concept of democracy and a radical constructive theory
of natural right…he elaborates not mere elements but rather democratic
thought in its entirety – and at the level, as yet still larval, of mass
capitalist society.
44

This form of democracy, living through the multitude, significantly differs from
the concepts of biopower and biopolitics introduced by Foucault. For Hardt and
Negri the core of biopolitics does not reside in the management of some
population, but in its allowing for new possibilities of political resistance in
conjunction with Spinoza’s idea of the “multitude.”
One such difference from Foucault lies in the way they distinguish
between biopolitics and biopower. For Foucault, biopower signifies the essential
condition whereby sovereignty shifts and focuses less on maintaining the power
over a territory but maintaining and applying power to the very fabric of life.
Biopolitics then is simply the different mechanisms, institutions, and formations
of this more fundamental form of biopower. For Hardt and Negri, conversely,
biopolitics does not convey the means to achieving biopower’s goal, but as a
point of potential alternative subjectivities with revolutionary tendencies set to
resist biopower’s seemingly totalitarian grip on life. Biopolitics is a struggle of
45

freedom internal to the system of biopower.
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The multitude, according to Negri’s reading of Spinoza, is life. It is not
life caught up in the tensions of the biopolitical practice of exclusion/inclusion as
outlined in Agamben, but life in a much more immediate sense, life prior to the
polis. As much as the regimes of biopower may try, they can never legitimately
capture and control the life of the multitude, because such life, such pure
democratic immediacy, will always exceed the strict boundaries of biopower.
Put differently, bare life exceeds and resists the docile codifications of life made
political. This excessive capability is precisely the essential structure of the
biopolitical. Borrowing from Deleuze and Guittari, they insist on the nomadic
function and character of life, always resistant to and uncontainable by the form
and workings of biopower.
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Terrorism may seem to conform to this system and even participate as
part of the revolutionary work of the multitude. In many instances, Hardt and
Negri speak about the multitude as a warring force, but they make a distinction
between this warring democratic multitude and outright terrorism, arguing that
terrorism works against biopower as a symmetrical or asymmetrical force. By
directly attacking the system of power in a way that borrows from that power’s
understanding of war and violence, it ends up replicating and reproducing the
same violence. The proposed concept of a warring multitude always wages a
47
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war against war itself, demonstrating the very ineffectuality of violence. This
48

type of warring against war attempts to counteract biopower not by direct
opposition or by using the forms of war that are part of Biopower. It attempts
and hopes to be radically different. Terrorism, something they vehemently resist
and criticize as ultimately impotent, does not function in the framework of this
democratic war because it simply borrows the failed techniques of biopower,
rather than formulating something new and affirmative.
Further, democratic violence for Hardt and Negri can only be legitimate
when serving a defensive end, and never an offensive one. Violence can protect
what the multitude creates, but it can never be the foundation of that creative
impulse. Democratic violence “does not initiate the revolutionary process but
rather comes only at the end, when the political and social transformation has
already taken place, to defend its accomplishments.”
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Terrorism then would fail the litmus test provided for articulating
democratically legitimate violence because it seeks to found something creative
and revolutionary through the violent act. But this notion of defensive violence
does not appear to be essentially or even substantially different from the type of
violence Foucault introduces through the concept of racism. This violence finds
justification through the defense of life itself against forces that seek to
undermine or destroy life. This racist form of violence introduced in Foucault
would appear as thoroughly appropriate within the framework of defensive
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violence established by Hardt and Negri. As such they simply fail to fully
consider the problem terrorism presents to modern political and biopolitical
institutions. By disregarding terror as creative and thereby a misuse of violence,
they end up supporting the violence Foucault finds alarming.
Hardt and Negri are of course not alone in defining terrorism as
ultimately impotent. Many scholars from a variety of political perspectives
share in this general view. Contrary to this position, there are those that offer
something that appears in many ways to be praise for terror as the only method
of resistance still available within a pervasive biopolitical system. Jean
Baudrillard falls into this category.
Baudrillard invokes the term terror in connection to a global power that
terrorism hopes to unravel. Globalization involves not just economics but a
robust symbolic exchange facilitated by technology, cohesive markets, and rapid
informational distribution. Universal human rights, freedom, culture, and
democracy all get subsumed within this globalizing force, a force which
continuously grows in power. This process transforms universal values such as
these into commodities, which can be valued, exchanged, regulated, and
consumed like other any other commodity. As a result of this vigorous
50

transformation, democratic processes and protections mutate into mechanized
and instrumentalized monstrosities of their previous forms.
As globalization grows in power and scope, Baudrillard cautions against
entering a moment in which no alternative to this ubiquitous influence remains.
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Biopolitics then is a type of historical limit point, and upon passing it we can find
no lesser version than the completely pervasive power over life. In this situation,
the significance of the singular vanishes, even singularity of experience becomes
a symbol interchangeable with other experiences. Terrorism offers a resistance to
this perverse symbolic exchange, remaining something totally and completely
negative in the terms of symbolic value. Terrorism is anti-value and as such antisymbol. It is not merely a religiously motivated act, or competing system of
ideas but instead a foundational disruption of a system that transforms
everything into commodity by being a singularity which it cannot transform, and
which it cannot give value.
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Baudrillard envisions 9/11 as an “absolute event” because it is a “pure
event uniting within itself all the events that have never taken place.” This
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terror attack, unlike anything before it, exposes the system of globalization to
something genuinely novel. He continues:
When global power monopolizes the situation to this extent, when there is
such a formidable condensation of all functions in the technocratic
machinery, and when no alternative form of thinking is allowed, what
other way is there but a terroristic situational transfer? It was the system
itself which created the objective conditions for this brutal retaliation. By
seizing all the cards for itself, it forced the Other to change the rules. And
the new rules are fierce ones, because the stakes are fierce. To a system
whose very excess of power poses an insoluble challenge, the terrorists
respond with a definitive act which is also not susceptible of exchange.
Terrorism is the act that restores an irreducible singularity to the heart of a
system of generalized exchange. All the singularities (species, individuals
and cultures) that have paid with their deaths for the installation of a
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global circulation governed by a single power are taking their revenge
today through this terroristic situational transfer.
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Terrorism does not produce or establish something other or beyond the global
biopolitical order, and it offers nothing hopeful or redemptive. It provides no
ideological backing and does not try to change the world into a better place. It
can only ever hope to, “radicalize the world through sacrifice.” Baudrillard
54

offers up the helpful claim that if, in fact, Islam did rise to take a global position
of power terrorism would revolt against it. Terrorism goes beyond Islamic or
religious duty, and simply serves as a pure counter to the global order of
symbolic exchange. It lacks all instrumentalization or basic utility and instead
serves as the complete and infinitely destructive opposite of all possible utility.
We continue to search for meanings or a series of causes behind an act of terror
when terrorism precisely and fully represents the very meaninglessness and
absence of all causality.
Terrorism creates a vacuum at the center of global power because it does
not directly confront global power but instead allows global power to unravel
itself around this center point of absolute meaninglessness. The tools global
power uses in approaching terrorism are the tools of power, and as a result only
work to undo power rather than undo the damage of terrorism. Global power
ends up undoing itself, attacking itself, and diminishing its own substantive
ideas of freedom, law, and justice. In the end our solutions, or more precisely
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the very idea of a possible solution becomes the primary force of terror. As
Baudrillard asserts:
There is no remedy for this extreme situation, and war is certainly not a
solution, since it merely offers a rehash of the past, with the same deluge
of military forces, bogus information, senseless bombardment, emotive
and deceitful language, technological deployment and brainwashing.
Like the Gulf War: a non-event, an event that does not really take place.
And this indeed is its raison-d'être: to substitute, for a real and
formidable, unique and unforeseeable event, a repetitive, rehashed
pseudo-event. The terrorist attack corresponds to a precedence of the
event over all interpretative models; whereas this mindlessly military,
technological war corresponds, conversely, to the model's precedence over
the event, and hence to a conflict over phony stakes, to a situation of 'no
contest’; War as a continuation of the absence of politics by other means.
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While Baudrillard continually insists both in language and ideas on
“globalized power” and never uses the terms biopolitics or biopower, some clear
connections exist between these concepts. Global order is about a series of
symbolic exchanges. Everything is given symbolic meaning and easily
substituted in the larger system of exchange operations. Death however has not
been given symbolic placement in this system of exchanges, but according to
Baudrillard has been pushed out. Baudrillard then does provide a truly unique
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theoretical position on biopolitics as the commodification of life in the abstract.
Finally, the work of Roberto Esposito attempts to remedy some of the
overly optimistic tendencies in Hardt and Negri and the more pessimistic
elements of Agamben, but in a way that fails to address some of the deepening
global political crisis biopower and biopolitics tend to elucidate. Esposito begins
his three-part work by examining the foundation of the community, and
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upending communitarian reliance on the dialectic between common and proper.
Communitarian definitions think of the community in terms of what they hold in
common versus what they hold properly as individuals. This commonality
could be anything from ethnicity to shared values, or anything that brings
individuals, as individuals, together, and then belonging to a totality “produced
by their union.” Instead Esposito investigates the etymological elements of
57

communitas with intense focus upon munus, and the idea of obligation. Rather
58

than envisioning and articulating community along the lines of what individuals
hold in common, Esposito offers an account of the community through what
individuals owe. Individuals owe to the communitas their identity and
subjectivity. The community, “expropriates them of their initial property (in part
or completely), of the most proper property, namely, their very subjectivity.”
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This proper owing of the subject exposes the individual to the contagion of living
alongside and in relation to others. In so much as the community exposes the
individual to contagions it likewise offers exemption and immunization for
certain members. Through this immunization, as the removal of certain
obligations for certain individuals, a way of thinking through and organizing this
removal of obligations arises, what Esposito labels the immunization paradigm.
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In reading Hobbes, Esposito focuses upon the biological reality of death
serving as the engine for Hobbes’ theory of the contract. What humans share,
according to Hobbes, is the fear of no longer being alive, and this fear of death
allows for the common practices which assure or assist in warding off this most
“powerful passion. ” The focus on self-preservation finds fulfillment in the
60

contract as the threshold between the state of nature and civil society. For
Hobbes the contract, the binding and willful agreement between the individual
and sovereign, allows for specific modes of protection of the self that grant selfpreservation. Esposito views this as the essential modern political project,
transforming natural inclinations of self-preservation into juridical and private
endeavors, mediated by a sovereign. The agreements and the demand of the gift
between individuals vanishes as the contract obliges submission to a sovereign in
total, rendering the interaction between individuals unnecessary. Those
interactions can be done through the immunization of further contracts, legal
practices, economic engagements, and bureaucratic precision.
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Esposito reevaluates and interrogates this immunized self-preservation
introduced by Hobbes for the sake a more robust, but risky, contagion inducing
interaction between individuals. An affirmative biopolitics, and a community

Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme and Power of a Commonwealth
Ecclesiastical and Civil, ed. By M. Oakshott (London: Collier Macmillan, 1962), 100.
60

Roberto Esposito, Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy, trans. T. Campbell
(Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 30.
61

56

substantiated through the gift and not through immunization, requires the risk
of contamination by coming into genuine and intimate contact with others.
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The reality of our situation further accentuates this contagion-centric view
of community. Even in the work of Michel Foucault, the dominant view
envisions bodies as completely discrete and impassable. However, reality
continually passes over the threshold of the body through a variety of biotechniques, including things such as transplants and vaccinations. We have
entered a historical period where bodies are shared and scattered globally,
shared with other bodies in ubiquitous ways, an entire bioeconomy.
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Esposito offers a unique and thrilling interpretation of the biopolitical.
Presenting not so much the overt affirmative biopolitics of Hardt and Negri, but
at the same time not seeing the final fulfillment of biopolitics in the
thanatopolitics endemic of Agamben’s work. Esposito offers the possibility of an
affirmative situation within the reality and presence of risk. Contagion and
contamination entail a risk between individuals, as the giving over of a gift
entails real possible loss. The affirmative possibilities are not inevitable, and as
such paying attention to the starkness of that risk, something both Agamben and
Foucault return to time and time again in their work, remains an important
endeavor in any investigation of the biopolitical.
Hardt and Negri, Baudrillard, and Esposito do not exhaust all the
theoretical work and concepts of biopolitics; however, by examining each some
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summary of the divergence that biopolitics has undergone in recent years is
made possible. Many theorists now use this term in hopes of better
understanding the contours of a politics that has gone farther and produced
more institutions than previous formations of governmental power. I return to
Foucault and Agamben as a primary and advantageous way of understanding
the concept, particularly as it relates to terrorism for a few reasons. Most
importantly, Agamben and Foucault both attend to the formative and necessary
elements of religion within their respective definitions and genealogies. Often,
biopolitical theory avoids or ignores the religious dimensions of the current
political age, or misappropriates religion as somehow external to biopolitics.
This miscalculation can have disastrous effects in how we come to understand
the problem of terrorism, as I will show later. In using both Foucault and
Agamben’s outline of biopolitics I arrive back at the primary distinguishing
characteristic of this biopolitical age: terrorism presents a unique problem for
biopolitics precisely because biopolitics addresses terrorism as a problem to be
overcome through further accentuations of biopower. A crisis and paradox
remain: a crisis and paradox that terrorism highlights.
Thinkers point out different ways the fundamental political crisis of our
time shows itself. Bare life, the thing which politics always separated itself from
since Aristotle, has been brought into the realm of the political. But the political
realm cannot house something so excessively large, so abundantly and infinitely
impossible to name, symbolize, and control. Terrorism, in targeting life explicitly,
re-announces the fragility of life and radically undermines the attempts to
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preserve life in diverse ways. In response, the biopolitical project attempts to
hide this fragility and the related failure to account for life.
This is the nature of the crisis of the biopolitical, beginning with this
fundamental crisis of instrumentalizing life, and then further by analyzing social
practices through this lens. Terrorism mimics and betrays this central crisis of the
biopolitical. It is possible there is no such thing as terrorism and instead there are
simply acts of violence, with varying degrees of political or religious rhetoric
attached to them, that come to be known by biopolitical institutions as “terror.”
But this field and set of phenomena we call terrorism is only called such in so
much as it participates in this system of instrumentalization. Terrorism, as a
discreet set of activities, partnerships, networks, and violence only exists within
the realm of global power. Global power creates terrorism through its
definitions and brings this meaningless act, according to Baudrillard, into the
system of symbolic exchanges and therefore gives it meaning. Kunming attests
to this. To name it a terrorist attack gives it a certain value in the system of
exchanges, a system essentially defined by the biopolitical paradox.
If there ever was such a thing as terrorism, 9/11 was quite possibly the
last act of terror, as it genuinely resisted such symbolic making and stood outside
this system of hyper-instrumentalization. But since, as one would expect from a
system that instrumentalizes and compartmentalizes everything, even life itself,
terrorism has come to be caught up in the same system of exchanges and used to
continue this crisis project.
The process of constructing terrorism, which mimics and repeats the
instrumental crisis of biopolitics, comes about as the product of security. In the
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coming chapters I will look at three specific forms of explaining terror-as
excessively violent, as corrupted religion, and as a negative economic force-and
show how each attempt to protect the crisis of biopolitics ends up only
reaffirming the ideas presented here.
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Chapter Two: Defining Terrorism: Economics, the Border, and
Biopolitics

The Definitions of Terrorism

Terrorism is a problem of biopolitics and not a problem for biopolitics.
Much of the reason for this lies in the ways biopolitical institutions and
neoliberal governments define and confront terrorism. Defining terror grounds
the possibilities of confrontation, while at the same time, the confrontation with
terror produces definitions. These concepts interact with each other in
contemporary political theory and media portrayals of the ongoing war on
terror.
In whatever definition and confrontation with terror, biopolitical regimes
are hopelessly destined to fail, because terrorism is not a problem which
biopolitics can solve. Rather the ways it defines and confronts terror reaffirm the
processes of biopolitics, namely the management of populations and the
attending race wars, the reduction of political life to bare life, and the
exclusion/inclusion mechanisms. Additionally, because biopolitics relies on
religious and theological concepts it further exacerbates a deeper religious
schism in the contemporary world.
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To show this reaffirmation of biopolitics through confrontation and definitions of
terror I focus on three of these definitional/confrontational forms. First,
contemporary discourse often describes terrorism as a problem of economic
destabilization. Terrorism takes away from an otherwise smooth global market
where everyone would eventually prosper, or conversely, if economic prosperity
was attained in certain areas of the globe terrorism would subsequently vanish.
Second, the definitions offered claim terrorism is excessively violent. The
definition and confrontation here focuses on the ways in which terrorism
produces terror because of just how violent it is, especially when compared to
state forms of violence. Finally, contemporary discourse articulates terrorism as
religious fervor gone awry.
While these definitions and confrontational frameworks do not exhaust all
possibilities, they do provide a helpful way of organizing and codifying the
variety of definitions available for terrorism. Definitions are difficult as they
serve as representations for a wide variety of potential actions, motivations, and
justifications within the mind of the terrorist. But by examining definitions
employed one can see the repetition of these three general themes.
For example, the 1994 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60
defines terrorism in the following way:
1. The States Members of the United Nations solemnly reaffirm their
unequivocal condemnation of all acts, methods and practices of terrorism,
as criminal and unjustifiable, wherever and by whomever committed,
including those which jeopardize the friendly relations among States and
peoples and threaten the territorial integrity and security of States;
2.

Acts, methods and practices of terrorism constitute a grave
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violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations, which may
pose a threat to international peace and security, jeopardize friendly
relations among States, hinder international cooperation and aim at the
destruction of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the democratic
bases of society;
3. Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror
in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political
purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the
considerations of a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic,
religious or any other nature that may be invoked to justify them.
1

Part one emphasizes the way terrorism destabilizes otherwise friendly actions in
an efficient economy. Part three emphasizes violent capabilities connected to a
broad series of motivations for that violence, with religion included both
implicitly and explicitly.
A similar definition from the Arab Convention on the Suppression of
Terrorism focuses on the way terror spreads a unique agenda as:
any act or threat of violence, whatever its motives or purposes, that occurs
for the advancement of an individual or collective criminal agenda,
causing terror among people, causing fear by harming them, or placing
their lives, liberty or security in danger, or aiming to cause damage to the
environment or to public or private installations or property or to occupy
or to seize them, or aiming to jeopardize a national resource.
2

This definition more directly focuses on harm to natural resources, showing the
connection of excessive violence to the economic negativity of terror.
The European Union offers a definition of terrorism both as an abstract act
and intention. Terrorism is

“United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60: Measures to Eliminate
International Terrorism,” December 9 , 1994, accessed May 12 , 2014,
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/49/a49r060.htm.
1
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“The Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism,” April 22, 1998,
accessed May 12 , 2014,
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/conv_arab_terrorism.en.pdf.
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seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a Government
or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any
act, or seriously destablising or destroying the fundamental political,
constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an
international organization.
3

It then continues with a list of specifically restricted behaviors that may constitute
terrorism:
Attacks upon a person's life which may cause death; attacks upon the
physical integrity of a person; kidnapping or hostage taking; causing
extensive destruction to a Government or public facility, a transport
system, an infrastructure facility, including an information system, a fixed
platform located on the continental shelf, a public place or private
property likely to endanger human life or result in major economic loss;
seizure of aircraft, ships or other means of public or goods transport;
manufacture, possession, acquisition, transport, supply or use of weapons,
explosives or of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, as well as
research into, and development of, biological and chemical weapons;
release of dangerous substances, or causing fires, floods or explosions the
effect of which is to endanger human life; interfering with or disrupting
the supply of water, power or any other fundamental natural resource the
effect of which is to endanger human life; threatening to commit any of
the acts listed.
4

Again, this definition focuses on violence and the threat of resources.
Finally, the United States government often relies on legal definitions of
terrorism, primarily used by governmental institutions such as the Federal
Bureau of Investigations:
18 U.S.C. § 2331 defines "international terrorism" and "domestic terrorism" for
purposes of Chapter 113B of the Code, entitled "Terrorism”:
"International terrorism" means activities with the following three
characteristics:

European Union: Council of the European Union, “Council Framework
Decision 2002/475 on Combating Terrorism,” June 13, 2002, accessed May 12 ,
2014, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3f5342994.html.
3
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§
§

§

Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that violate federal
or state law;
Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion;
or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination, or kidnapping; and
Occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S., or
transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are
accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or
coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek
asylum.

"Domestic terrorism" means activities with the following three characteristics:
§
§

§

Involve acts dangerous to human life that violate federal or state law;
Appear intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,
assassination. or kidnapping; and
Occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.

18 U.S.C. § 2332b defines the term "federal crime of terrorism" as an offense
that:
§

§

Is calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government by
intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government conduct;
and
Is a violation of one of several listed statutes, including § 930(c)
(relating to killing or attempted killing during an attack on a federal
facility with a dangerous weapon); and § 1114 (relating to killing or
attempted killing of officers and employees of the U.S.).
5

Largely speaking, these definitions show the political ways of
understanding terror in terms of similar characteristics: a focus on violence that
has some excessive element and some threat to an otherwise efficient economic

Federal Bureau of Investigations, “Definitions of Terrorism in the U.S. Code,”
accessed May 12 , 2014, http://www.fbi.gov/aboutus/investigate/terrorism/terrorism-definition.
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force. Outside the realm of governmental agencies and offices, in the world of
critical theorists, political philosophers, and religious scholars, other definitions
exist but, again, they share in the above-mentioned common traits of economic
negativity, excessive violence, and religious fervency. For example, James and
Brenda Lutz offer the following definition:
Terrorism involves political objectives and goals. It relies on violence or
the threat of violence. It is designed to generate fear in a target audience
that extends beyond the immediate victims of the violence. The violence
involves an organization and not isolated individuals. Terrorism involves
a non-state actor or actors as the perpetrator of the violence, the victims, or
both. Finally, terrorism is violence that is designed to create power in
situation in which power has previously been lacking (i.e. the violence
attempts to enhance the power base of the organization undertaking the
action.
6

They go on to emphasize the overt political aims of terrorism as the essential
characteristic of terrorism vis-à-vis other forms of violence. While political in its
foundation, Lutz and Lutz offer different formations terrorism can take:
communal terrorism, ideological terrorism, pragmatic/instrumental terrorism.

7

A project that combined 73 definitions of terrorism covered in 55 different
articles offered the following definition of terrorism: “Terrorism is a politically
motivated tactic involving the threat or use of force or violence in which the
pursuit of publicity plays a significant role.” Uniquely, these authors used
8
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publicity within their definition, but publicity and notoriety would be outside
the bounds of normal economic functions.
To this point, most of the definitions have emphasized the negative
economic force of terrorism or the overt, unique, and excessive violence and
tended to minimize or ignore the religious element. However, there are many
definitions of terror that explicitly focus on the religious dimensions.
The work of Mark Juergensemeyer and Reza Aslan both subsume the
economic and violent elements under the umbrella of a certain type of religious
fervency. Juergensmeyer’s well-known book Terror in the Mind of God and many
of his articles express the idea that terrorist acts are motivated primarily, if not
entirely, through the religious framework of “Cosmic War.” This concept of
9

cosmic war not only gives it a distinctly religious shade, it does so by overtly
contrasting itself with those more political definitions. As Juergensmeyer writes
in one article:
In the contemporary political climate, therefore, religious activists have
provided a solution to the perceived insufficiencies of Western-style
secular politics. As secular ties have begun to unravel in the post-Soviet
and postcolonial era, local leaders have searched for new anchors to
ground their social identities and political loyalties. What is ideologically
significant about these religious movements is their creativity. Although
many of them have reached back in history for ancient images and
concepts that will give them credibility, theirs are not simply efforts to

See Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of God, (Los Angeles: The University
of California Press, 2003); Mark Juergensmeyer, “Religious Antiglobalism,” in
Religion and Global Civil Society, ed. Mark Juergensmeyer (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2005); Mark Juergensmeyer, “Martyrdom and Sacrifice in a
Time of Terror,” Social Research: and International Quarterly Vol. 75 Issue 2 (2008);
Reza Aslan, Beyond Fundamentalism: Confronting Religious Extremism in the Age of
Globalization (New York: Random House, 2009).
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resuscitate old ideas from the past. They offer contemporary ideologies
that meet present-day social and political needs.
10

For cosmic warriors, religion offers a corrupted alternative to other political
institutions. Cosmic war theory outlines this perversion of religion in a few
ways. First, cosmic war arises out of a sense of urgency and the need for
immediate action in the world. The adherents of selective religious visions of
11

the world see our time in history as radically at risk. Second, the idea of victory
in a cosmic war lies in a world exterior to this one. Within this worldview,
12

material reality provides a disadvantageous lack of military or economic power
to the religious adherent. Western liberal democracy, and its attending
globalized economy, spread so rapidly and is such an overwhelming force that
as a result religious conceptions of the world envision a metaphysical stage for
the struggle. Juergensmeyer calls this process “Satanization.” Enemies are seen
to be potentially anywhere and everywhere. In a traditional form of war,
13

enemies are known and objectively recognizable, but in a cosmic war, it may be
harder to locate the enemy because Satan can take many diverse forms. Further,
opposing the process of “Satanization” justifies actions of the religious terrorist
through participation with a deity. The deity confirms and sanctions the
14
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terrorist’s activities because they are directed at a metaphysical enemy; the
religious terrorist participates alongside the divine, while the enemy participates
with Satan.
The result of defining the enemy as participating in the actions of Satan
allows the cosmic warrior to partition the world into binary categories of good
and evil. This partitioning prohibits any middle ground between the two
15

extremes and consequently justifies violence against anyone, even children. The
16

ability to distinguish combatant from civilian erodes as a consequence of the
cosmic warrior’s logic; a logic that categorizes everyone into warring camps
regardless of the individual’s will or desire.
The starkness of this binary division makes any peaceful negotiation
impossible. In the mind of the cosmic warrior any enemy, as a participant on the
17

side of Satan, lies and cannot be trusted to adhere to the outline of a peaceful
settlement. Also, compromising in a cosmic war could put the warrior outside
the graces of the divine figure, and therefore subject to metaphysical
punishment.
Finally, this binary division between those on the side of the divine and
those on the side of Satan gives meaning to suffering. The root cause of any
18
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suffering experienced by the cosmic warrior lies in the actions of the enemy.
Suffering and the enemy eternally coexist as partners and as pollutants in the
divinely intended order of the world, resulting in a situation whereby ending the
enemy provides the only means of ending suffering.
Such religiously grounded definitions allow alternative strategies for
confronting terrorism. As Reza Aslan writes,
It is within such 'identity vacuums' that Global Jihadism thrives. For kids
like Hasib Hussain, whose religious and cultural affinities have been cast
by their societies as other, Jihadism is more than an alternative form of
identity - it is a reactionary identity, a means of social rebellion. It is an
identity formed through the deliberate linking of local and global
grievances - both real and perceived - to create a single, shared narrative
of suffering and injustice. And only by severing that link, and disrupting
the narrative, can Global Jihadism be defeated.
19

Increasingly, theorists and policy advisors within areas that traditionally
reproduce political definitions of terror are taking heed of such religious
definitions. One example, an article by Heather S. Gregg a professor at the Naval
Postgraduate School, argues that changing the way western democracies think
about terrorists with respect to religion and cosmic warfare, will allow for new
strategic options in dealing with terrorism. As she suggests:
Broadly, U.S. policy should aim to depolarize the Manichean thinking of
these cosmic warriors and not play into it. Specifically, the U.S.
government should stray away from making this a war of values, which
mirrors the rhetoric of Al Qaeda's ideology and feeds the logic that both
sides are locked in a zero sum battle of right versus wrong, where the
other side want to take away the other's way of life. Describing the
GWOT as a battle where the terrorists 'want to take away our freedom'
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and other values, places the conflict in the spiritual realm, making it ripe
for cosmic war.
20

Beyond the examples and definitions given, there are those who think
outside of both the political and religious frameworks as they define terrorism,
offering a more critical approach. These theorists borrow from a wide variety of
academic disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, economics, religious
studies, philosophy, and political theory to articulate new and different ways of
understanding this phenomenon. Two examples expanding the field of terror
studies are Rethinking the Roots of Terrorism by Jason Franks and the article “The
Case for a Critical Terrorism Studies” by Richard Jackson, Jereon Gunning, and
Marie Breen Smyth.
Jason Franks expands and provides for a more sophisticated reading of
terrorism than what he calls “orthodox terror studies:”

21

The study of terrorism has not progressed beyond the realist positivist
state-centric approach because it is a discourse created and employed with
the express purpose of providing the state with an understanding of
terrorism that is based upon a relative legitimacy. This allows the state to
deal with terrorism without engaging in a roots debate, as it perceives
terrorism as a threat to its security. It can therefore employ whatever
means it chooses against whomever it wishes.
22

By focusing on the covert power structures that influence the ways official
governmental agencies come to recognize terror, Franks attempts to uncover
entrenched political patterns. He still defines terrorism as lethal, political
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violence but expands the motivations for this violence beyond simple definitions
provided in more traditional forms of terrorist studies. Traditionally defined,
terrorism undermines a state-centric model of governance, but by moving away
from state-centric approaches and seeing terrorism within a framework of
conflict, he shows the way terrorists may have legitimate political claims that the
state ignores. He then provides four different perspectives for holistically
investigating terrorism: the state, the non-state actor, the systemic issues, and the
individual.
At the level of the state, Franks shows the way official governmental
programs, policies, and agencies exacerbate and motivate terrorism through its
responses to terror. The non-state actor potentially has legitimate grievances
23

regarding valid socio-economic needs and because of this disenfranchisement
they may strive for legitimacy through violence. This requires the state to
recognize the role of non-state actors in global politics. Systemic issues may also
24

contribute to the motivations of the terrorist, in that cultural or historical
narratives could escalate violence when conflicts arise. Franks argues that
ignoring the historical and cultural background of the non-state actors could
result in missing important elements within the reasoning behind committing
acts of violence. Such background influences can arise in the form of ideology or
religious conviction. Finally, the use of violence can be the consequence of
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extremely private concerns of a lone individual. He offers these different
25

perspectives in hope of providing new solutions to the problems terrorism
presents, arguing,
The aim of this study is to relocate terrorism out of this relative moral
quagmire of 'subjective' politics and into the realm of conflict where it can
be seen simply as an act of violence within a wider context. This will
allow the understanding of terrorism to develop alongside changes in
contemporary conflict and will provide it with access to a roots debate
and the whole spectrum of multi-dimensional techniques available for
conflict resolution.
26

Critical Terrorism Studies brings together an eclectic interdisciplinary group
of theorists to describe the limitations of current research on terrorism, and in
response, provide a different approach to the problem. From this initial project
sprang a journal series, Critical Studies in Terrorism, that serves as the primary
medium for unique critical perspectives on the issue.
Both the initial project and the resulting journal share the same
fundamental idea regarding much of the work within the field of terror studies.
Describing the contemporary situation, the editors write:
More recently, it has been possible to detect a growing sense of unease
from many different quarters with both the state of much current
terrorism studies research output and the practical outworking of Western
counterterrorism policies - which are often rooted in, or at least
legitimised with reference to, the orthodox terrorism studies
literature...Similarly, the mixed achievements of the global war on terror,
together with its morally disturbing and counter-productive aspects such
as foreign invasion, the Guantanamo Bay internment camp, extraordinary
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rendition, the use of torture, and erosion of civil liberties, has engendered
a growing sense of political disquiet dismay.
27

Like Franks, the assertions here expand the scope and reach of research into
terrorism, taking more seriously systemic issues of globalization, identity, and
socio-economic factors.
In general, the critical approach to terrorism resists orthodox approaches
to understanding terrorism and seek out new possibilities of engagement
through critical theory. Not all the theorists within this approach agree, as some
tension comes about over the term “critical.” Even so, the general goal of
28

finding solutions to the problem remain, even if the debate shifts to focus on
uprooting tacit assumptions that the field relies upon.
Regardless of the type of definition offered, whether from a policy and
agency perspective, a religious perspective, or a critical perspective; all agree on
some essential difference between western liberal forms of violence and acts of
terrorism. While critical terrorism studies attempt to unpack the forms of state
violence that may exacerbate or motivate terrorists, it still maintains a
fundamental division by insisting that terrorism is a problem with possible
solutions.
My approach seeks to define terrorism not as a distinct and dichotomous
form of violence separate from western liberal forms violence; due to the fact
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that, within the biopolitical epoch, terrorism is not an exterior problem with a
solution. Instead, it comes about as the secretions and manifestation of a
fundamental crisis within biopolitics. This crisis manifests in a few distinct, but
overlapping, forms of defining terror as offered above: first, terrorism as a
negative economic force in an otherwise smooth global ordering of goods and
services; second, as excessively violent; and finally, as religion gone awry.
Initially focusing on the economic issues of terrorism demands some
reduction in scope. The global economy is a vast, tangled and complicated
phenomenon, but much can be detected about the interactions between biopower
and terror by taking into consideration the role and presence of the border.

The Border

As a preliminary claim, the narrative around terrorism emphasizes a
negative economic consequence of terror. By looking at the complicated
relationship between the border and economic trade, a counter narrative arises
that shows the productive elements of terrorism connected to the globalized
economy.
This counter narrative begins with the movement of goods and services
across a globalized landscape and the requirement of borders over which these
goods and services travel. At first glance, the border serves as an ideal type of
heterotopic space described by Michel Foucault, as borders bring into one place
several unique factors. The border acts as component of culture making,
bordering off one cultural milieu from another, and the movement over the
75

border presents a deviation from that cultural norm. The border provides the
internal citizen stability and political identification and at the same time, they are
spaces where individuals in transition exist not as singular political subjects, but
as a subject between identities. Additionally, borders bring together varied
29

historical processes into a single recognized formation, and are the spaces where
cultural ideas evolve. Wars are waged to fortify or expand borders and function
in different ways: as porous or rigid depending on the societal shifts over time.
The border also brings together into a single space things that are generally
incompatible. For example, they bring into contact two very distinct sets of
30

codes and laws. The border not only spatializes the relationships between two
national territories, it affirms the entire international order. Finally, the border
both opens and closes, it can be crossed and it can prohibit movement. The
31

process, codes, and laws of the border allow and disallow crossing under a
variety of different conditions and with complex consequences. As Foucault
writes, these spaces,
look like pure and simple openings, but that, generally, conceal curious
exclusions. Everybody can enter into those heterotopian emplacements,
but in fact it is only an illusion: one believes to have entered and, by the
very fact of entering, one is excluded.
32
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As we can see from Foucault’s conception of hetertopias as applied to the
border, these spaces define much of our political lives, while remaining
hopelessly fragile and impotent as the points of transgression. Economies
demand porous borders, while at the same time demanding rigidity as
protection from potentially negative elements. The challenge for state
institutions is the management of such a paradoxical condition. In response to
this challenge, some states have opted for more stringent regulation and the
production of visible signs of those regulations through the spectacle of the wall.
Wendy Brown speaks of this proliferation of wall building, highlighting three
central paradoxes made evident in the flurry of fence building:
First, even as those across a wide political spectrum – neoliberals,
cosmopolitans, humanitarians, and left activists – fantasize a world
without borders (whether consequent to global entrepreneurship, global
markets, global citizenship, or global governance), nation-states, rich and
poor, exhibit a passion for wall building. Second, within the ostensibly
triumphant universal political form, democracy (heralded by European
post-Marxists, Islamic secularists, or American neoconservatives, even if
each inflects democracy differently), we confront not only barricades, but
passageways through them segregating high-end business traffic,
ordinary travelers, and aspiring entrants deemed suspect by virtue of
origin or appearance. Third, in a time featuring capacities for destruction
historically unparalleled in their combined potency, miniaturization, and
mobility, from bodies wired for explosion to nearly invisible biochemical
toxins, these deadly but incorporeal powers are perversely answered by
the stark physicalism of walls. So, three paradoxes: one featuring
simultaneous opening and blocking, one featuring universalization
combined with exclusion and stratification, and one featuring net worked
and virtual power met by physical barriers.
33
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Internal and External Boundaries

One can easily reduce the paradox down to a question of simply identifying
friends from enemies, repurposing Carl Schmitt’s primary definition of the
political. But the relationships are more complicated, as Aihwa Ong shows
34

through adopting Agamben’s notions of biopolitics. She argues that borders are
simultaneously permissive and regulative, and individuals are subject to a
multiplicity of borders and spaces of exclusion within the bordered nation-state.
Tensions at the border between opposing states, also exist inside the border,
making the friend/enemy distinction more complicated.
Classic models of political sovereignty focus on exterior and interior
relationships demarcated by national boundaries. Contemporary biopolitical
forms of governance additionally demarcate the interior of the nation with
different levels and modes of sovereign activity for different populations within
the territory. If a certain segment of the population generates economic growth,
less restrictions and disciplinary powers are placed on those populations,
particularly when it comes to passing over the border. On the other hand,
35

should a population antagonize or detract from perceived economic growth,
disciplinary power increases, especially as it comes to passing over the border
unhindered. The interior national territory does not possess a homogenous form
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of sovereignty, and instead has different types of sovereign action upon different
populations, creating a patchwork of different governmental policies within the
same national boundary.

36

This patchwork results in complications with international arrangements
regarding borders. While Agamben tends to focus on negative exceptions to the
law, those figures excluded from the legal order, Ong reverses this proposition,
focusing on positive exclusionary practices. National boundaries, sovereign
independence, and trade restrictions may be suspended for the sake of economic
growth and development. As a result, individuals supersede normal functions
37

of the law at the border, and can move freely through international zones
provided they offer some special economic advantage. Regular legal
maintenance and penalties at the border still apply to those who offer little or no
economic advantage.
Ong and Brown both demonstrate the ways in which internal and external
boundaries contribute to smooth flowing economies. Etienne Balibar, on the
other hand, argues that in addition to the economic factors involved, borders
produce identities. By producing stable identities within a border, it reduces
potential complexities between various groups. This allows increased
38

management by the state over a homogenous grouping of citizen-subjects, and
accurately measures the populations within that border. Borders allow for an
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epistemological goal of recording each individual citizen-subject, organizing the
territory and maintaining a stable but porous border. Within Bablibar’s
articulation, borders do more than offer a point of crossing but help construct a
larger international collection of sovereignties that manage and continually
produce the border. Further, such borders do not mean the same thing for
everyone: for certain populations the border may represent an exotic vacation
while for others the border produces anxiety and fear of potential legal
retribution.

Biometrics: The Movement of Bodies

Advancements in the field of biometrics, which transform the body into a
series of biological data points, also contribute to the inclusion and exclusion
practices at the border. However, biopolitics and the taking up of life as an issue
connected to the border does not only exist in the Agambenian form of inclusion
and exclusion, but also in the actual organization and maintenance of
biologically lived bodies. Btihaj Ajana offers a three-part definition of biometrics
that references some key features of biopower. First, biometrics literally measure
bare life. It is a technology that takes up biological information like fingerprints,
facial patterns, and vocalizations to identify and verify a person’s identity.
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While these tools utilized in identity and verification are relatively new, the
general approach by governments of measuring and cataloging the body has a
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long history, bringing old concerns into contemporary capabilities. Perhaps the
most primordial of these techniques was anthropometry, a written description of
the physical characteristics that could assist in the securing the identity of a
suspect. These later developed into the more common “mugshot,” which state
agencies employ still today. From this initial activity other technologies arose,
such as fingerprinting. Biometrics in contemporary society are not something
new, but are a modern variant of long sought after processes of fixing,
measuring, and establishing identity.
While the technologies today greatly increase biometric capabilities, many
older technologies are still very much a part the contemporary situation.
Fingerprints are still readily used by governmental agencies in attempts to
diminish and stop crime, including terrorism. For example, the most common
identifying element for a terror attack is the fingerprint left on bomb making
materials. The current database used by the FBI contains 110 million individual
print records, while the Department for Homeland Security possesses 156 million
records. These numbers may appear rather large, but are relatively small when
40

compared to the ongoing biometric Aadhaar project in India, with a goal of
enrolling 1.2 billion participants, or the entire population of India.
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Charlotte Epstein offers a similar description of biometrics as that of
Ajana, but with some additions to issues of risk. She writes:
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(Biometrics) identify a person: these constitute sets of measurements
derived from the print or photo of distinctive body parts (face, finger, the
hand, the iris) or a behavioural trait (voice, signature or even keystroke)
that constitute markers of individuality. Access is granted to that person
once she has been correctly identified (‘authenticated’, in the engineering
lingo). They are risk-based surveillance systems, where the risk-to-bemanaged is the penetration into the secure space by an unauthorized or
undesirable body.
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While such systems claim to eliminate or diminish personal human error
from the process of recognition, they do have some limitations. Currently, there
is not a complete catalog available that would be able to establish the identity of
all individuals, as they can only test particulars against a database of identities
already collected. Many fall outside of available databases and therefore have no
way of verifying identity. This serves as the endpoint for database structuring
goals, the goal being the creation of a database reducing unknowns and errors
down to zero by collecting, measuring, and cataloging every member of the
global population.
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Epstein offers other insights into the way biometrics and biopolitics
interact. For one, biometrics provides a measuring technique based on the living
body. It simultaneously provides information on the larger population, subject
to management, through the processes of individualizing technology (looking at
the single lived body). In addition, travelers who wish to pass over borders must
submit to the scrutiny of biometrics. This results in reducing the traveler to a
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mere body, purely biological and subject to measurement and analysis to
determine the riskiness of that individual. The transition between spaces of
travel necessitate the reduction of the traveler to bare life.
Biometric endeavors do not only restrict, control, and securitize borders,
they can also be used for other goals. For example, some research indicates the
possibility of utilizing biometrics to eliminate fraudulent behavior in financial
transactions. Additionally, biometric identification could allow individuals
proof of identity allowing access to governmental institutions, benefits, or to
eliminate voter fraud. These could open new avenues for the inclusion of
otherwise excluded populations. For example:
A number of reports on financial inclusion of the poor have been
produced in tandem with the establishment of the UID system, mapping
their income, economic patterns and access to credit. The main focus of
these documents has been to ensure a rapid inclusion of the poor into the
formal banking and insurance system. The biopolitical imperative to
govern life is thus further rearranged in the logics of the assemblage.
Here, biopolitical management of the population is combined with the
various globalizing forms of self-entrepreneurship fostered by the ‘global
form’ of neoliberalism. The mechanisms and characteristics of biopolitical
‘security’ thereby turn into a concern for the entirety of a population and
the optimization of its productive potential.
44
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Whether one considers the inclusive elements of biometrics highlighted above, or
the exclusive practices of restricting the movement of certain bodies across
borders, the decisions made remain obscured by a wall of technological
anonymity. No single individual makes the decisions over whether a person
should be denied entry at a border, instead the decisions are made by invisible
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algorithms detached from single figures. Considering this reality in relation to
ongoing immigration programs highlights some interesting characteristics of
modern politics. No single person can ever take the responsibility for either
deportations or amnesty. A series of internal mechanisms, biometric
checkpoints, and abstract policies regarding populations funnel and direct real
human beings through a series of governmental institutions and programs. The
promises of political progress toward increased amnesty, or initiatives toward
more rigid practices of deportation always remain separate from individual
actors. In a strange paradoxical way, the technologies involved in biometrically
hyper-individualizing humans simultaneously allow a complete nonindividualization when it comes to such decisions.

The Risk of Borders

Even amidst such a paradox, the reality of biometrics, a uniquely
biopolitical practice at the border, only happens because of increased anxieties
from the internal state about the potential arrival of certain bodies. Bodies
present risks to the biopolitical state as a contaminant. Benjamin Muller refers to
this contamination risk in the following way:
The biometric risk state speaks to altered imaginations and relations
between liberty and security, and how these play out in/at various sites,
such as increasingly prevalent ‘virtual borders’, is of central interest. Like
the changing dispositif of security asserted earlier, the biometric state
involves an odd mixture of the geopolitical and the biopolitical, as well as
increasing reliance on the mechanisms and technologies of risk. In this
case, such technologies of risk are applied directly to the reference object
of species life itself. In other words, it is particular forms of life that read
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as risky, or bodies that are not readable represent vulnerability to the
biometric state and its obsession with digital life.
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The border then serves as a filter to eliminate the risk of certain bodies, while
freely allowing other bodies to enter. As a result, a spectrum arises measuring
each body that approaches the border in terms of the risk they present. This
spectrum interacts with Foucault’s concept of racial wars in remarkable ways, as
biometrics moves beyond the individual body to identify entire risky
populations. For example, the Global Public Health Network monitors a variety
of data spanning all sorts of media sources across the globe for indications of
biological breakouts. These biological breakouts produce new populations that
increase in position on the risk spectrum. The breaking down of individual
bodies to the molecular level undergirds the racial wars fought in protection of
the species. As Bruce Braun states:
While it may be true that in industrialized liberal democracies this model
of the ‘somatic’ self holds sway, there is another dimension to the
molecularization of life that has received far less attention. This has to do
with the conceptualization of the body in forms of its displacements within
wider molecular fields. That is, at the same time that molecular biology
and genetics have given us a body known at the molecular scale, and thus
made the physical mechanisms of ‘life’ available to political and economic
calculation in new ways, they have also, in conjunction with the science of
immunology and virology, given us another way to conceive of our
biological existence, no longer in terms of a self-contained body whose
genetic inheritance is to be managed and improved, but in terms of a body
embedded in a chaotic and unpredictable molecular world, a body
understood in terms of a general economy of exchange and circulation,
haunted by the specter of newly emerging or still unspecifiable risks.
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Those bodies with increased risk open the possibility of expungement or
elimination within the protected population. Too close of contact with certain
animals, eating certain foods, or partaking in certain practices all warrant a
heightened possibility of exposure to unwanted biological agents and may
increase the risk to life. Biological decisions must be made for the security of life
and these decisions occur at both the molecular level and at the level of
populations.
This breaking down of the body into constituent parts at the molecular
level attempts to predict, manage, and address a risk that has not yet arrived.
Following Deleuze , Braun envisions this risk as virtual, yet to occur but still
48

foundational to the conditions of the present. The conditions of the present
produce virtual threats that must be reduced, managed, and, if possible,
eliminated for the sake of securing life. The threats, at least within the view of
biosecurity, arrive in strict relation with those new technologies that allowed for
the molecularization of the body in the first place. Just as the border and the
movement of goods and services demand a paradoxical increase of both
openness and rigidity, so also the body demands both the freedom to move
while simultaneously reducing risk.
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Digitized Borders

To this point, the border has only been described in terms of actual spaces,
but to realize the true complexity of the border, and from this the global
economy, requires thinking beyond space. Gilles Deleuze, in his formal writings
on the “control society,” offers such an understanding of borders. Within a
control society,
the key thing is no longer a signature or number but a code: codes are
passwords, whereas disciplinary societies are ruled (when it comes to
integration or resistance) by precepts. The digital language of control is
made up codes indicating whether access to some information should be
allowed or denied.
49

This creates a situation where a border is not merely a heterotopic-spatial
product where goods, services, and people cross but, in addition to the spatial,
the border can also be non-spatial and virtual. In new globalized economies, the
border as both a spatial and virtual reality often replicates and reproduces the
challenges faced by more traditional sovereign and spatial forms of the border.
For example, people still demand a free-flowing and deregulated virtual space
while simultaneously demanding security over the privacy of their personal
information, financial records, and internet use. The new forms of virtual
borders transition from the strict movement of people and goods, to the passage
of data, but the same demand of porousness and rigidity remain.
The non state-centric models of the internet generate massive obstacles for
regulatory policies over these virtual borders. The internet does not belong to
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any nation or group, and the borders between virtual users lack the clear
definitions often associated with traditional spatial borders. These difficulties in
50

policing virtual borders have consequences not just for governmental agencies,
but also for the private sector. Users of the popular online streaming service
Netflix recently discovered that if one used software they could mask their
geographic location and effectively tell Netflix servers they reside in parts of the
world where they do not. This results in accessing programs that may not be
available in one geographic region, but are in another.
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The Netflix example demonstrates that often virtual borders and
geographic borders intermingle in unpredictable ways. Virtual space, and access
to information, can depend on our geographic location, while at the same time,
geographic spacing can be augmented by virtual interaction.
To this point, focus on the border has demonstrated its importance in the
movement and exchange of economic positives. The complexities of the border,
along the lines of biopolitical inclusion and exclusion practices maintain an
economic global order, whereby the border, whether virtual or geographic,
demands a paradoxical porousness and rigidity at the same time. The
porousness of the border centers on the economics involved, as the movements
of goods, services, and even data all make for economic advantage and growth.
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Risk, on the other hand, demands the borders be rigid and propel threats away
from the homogenized and managed interior.
In response to potential threats, the U.S. implemented and developed
“smart border” technologies:
The Smart Border plan is premised on bilateral cooperation that enables
the United States to deploy information technology to practice risk
management targeting of vehicles, shipments, and travelers, and to push
the United States’ ‘borders out,’ while at the same time it attempts to
minimize the impact of border controls on trade and travel.
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Overly simplifying borders as social constructions, while accurate, misses key
elements. They are socially constructed, but with very particular needs in mind.
Borders technologically control and manage the risk to an internal population,
while simultaneously demanding the free movement of goods, services, and
data. They are bound networks and informational passages that layer the world
through a series of coded entry and exit points, regulating and protecting an
internal order while participating in a larger external series of international
arrangements.
Terrorism, among other things, threatens the integrity of porous borders.
As a result, territories regulate negative potentialities at the border, prohibiting
and controlling movement and thereby producing new forms of movement in
response. To bypass the border new creative endeavors are introduced by
terrorists, resulting in new securitizing measures, and then responses to those
measures. Making the border both porous and rigid creates a cycle of responses
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and counter-responses. The internal strategies employed to rigidify the borders
frame terrorism as a thoroughly negative impact to the otherwise free movement
of goods, services, and data across borders.
The 2014 Ebola crisis serves as a fruitful analogy to the problem of
terrorism and the border. During the summer of that year the Ebola crisis
reached its zenith, as at least 65 individuals infected with the disease began
arriving in the United States and Europe from Western Africa. Attempting to
contain the problem and curtail public panic, Senator Ted Cruz along with
others, proposed eliminating all flights into the U.S. from Western Africa. Those
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in agreement with this proposal argued that by eliminating movement at the
border and making it more rigid, the threat would diminish. In response, the
Obama administration and others argued that allowing flights to continue would
make it easier to track and monitor the movement of people believed to be
infected. The results of a rigid border would be an increased creativity in the
ways people would move into the territory undetected, and thereby minimized
the government’s ability to track, monitor, and confront the disease.
This entire episode highlights the economic issues connected to the
biological reality of the disease. The often understated but secretly pervasive
counter-argument to Cruz was the diminished revenues airline industries would
face in the rigidifying of the border.
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Regardless of the political, biological and economic implications of this
crisis, one central point arose from this ordeal. The very same channels utilized
for the movement of goods, services, and data can produce the demise of the
groups who maintain those channels. Ebola was not only a medical and
biological risk, it was an economic risk.

Shared Paths: Terrorism and Economic Movement

Arguments against the neoliberal order of a globalized economy whereby
the movements of goods, services, and data freely move over transnational
borders, often miss the point that those channels by which those things move are
not solely devoted to the movement of those things. Many different possible
items such as biological contaminants, people, currencies, slaves, destructive
ideologies, and weaponry rely on the same recognized, authorized, and
monitored networks. The positive economic elements and negative elements
travel the same paths simultaneously, sometimes aware and sometimes unaware
of their co-travelers.
This reality goes both ways. Groups like al Qaeda hypocritically rely on
the networks they seek to resist:
This grafting of entirely modern sensibilities and techniques to the most
radical interpretation of holy war is the hallmark of bin Laden’s network.
One of his Afghan training camps during the late nineties was named alBadr, after a key seventh-century battle fought by the Prophet
Muhammad, yet al-Qaeda members training there were tutored in the use
of high-tech explosives such as RDX and C4. Members of al-Qaeda
perform bayat, a quasi-medieval oath of allegiance to their emir or leader.
But while based in Sudan in the early nineties, they also drew monthly
paychecks and supported themselves with a wide range of legitimate
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businesses. When bin Laden declared war on Americans in 1996, he
described U.S. soldiers stationed in the Middle East as ‘the Crusaders,’ as
if the crusades of the Middle Ages were still being fought, and signed his
declaration ‘from the peaks of the Hindu Kush mountains of Afghanistan,’
a place barely touched by the modern world. That declaration of war was
written on an Apple computer and then faxed or e-mailed to supporters in
Pakistan and Britain, who in turn made it available to Arabic newspapers
based in London, which subsequently beamed the text via satellite, to
printing centers all over the Middle East and in New York. Thus, a
premodern message was delivered by postmodern means.
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Private corporate interests securitized through neoliberal governments are not
separate from the things which those security mechanisms hope to eliminate. In
fact, they co-participate in the very same networks alongside each other, often
with incalculable effects. The cases of both Ebola and al Qaeda demonstrate the
possibilities of this network sharing along the routes that move goods, services,
labor, and data. The demand for porous borders and the free movement of
goods, services, labor, and data contributes to the in-securitizing effects that in
turn produce demands for more rigid borders.
An entire industry has arisen to meet the paradoxical demands of both
open and closed borders. Security consultants, military installations,
checkpoints, biometric scanners, risk assessment specialists, and even insurance
actuaries all participate in the process to keep the movements happening while
still protecting against the potential threats initiated by terror groups. By
maintaining and ordering the pathways along which goods, services, labor and
data, move this security industry makes those pathways even more efficient.
The increased efficiency of those pathways, like those travelers who would still
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find entrance into the U.S. should airlines stop arriving from West Africa, find
new and increasingly efficient ways to produce terror. Increased technology
produces increased vulnerability. It is for this reason that Didier Bigo and others
lament the security industry as the (in)security industry.
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The war on terror then does not produce an economic negative, but in fact
participates and generates economic activities. The demands for a porous border
to move things creates a situation of vulnerability which then demands a
securitizing response, which makes the networks of movement more efficient,
which then opens new possibilities for terrorism which then creates new
securitizing demands. They work together, terror and security, supporting and
justifying each other in a myriad of unpredictable and economically fruitful
ways.
There are those who see this interaction between the war on terror and the
globalized economic order and provide some nuanced ways of understanding
the codependency between the two. First, some see the war on terror as a way of
expanding neoliberal economic activities into geographic regions where the
power structures in place prohibit or hinder economic expansion. Gordon Lafer
examines this dynamic, arguing:
I believe that, in its broadest logic, the war [on terror] must be understood
as a means of advancing the neoliberal agenda of global economic
transformation. Both abroad and at home, the pattern of administrative
behavior reflects an ambitious and aggressive drive to restructure the
economy in line with neoliberal dictates.
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By using the invasion of Iraq as an example, Lafer continues,
The choice of Iraq as the target of invasion and occupation was no doubt
driven both by Iraq’s vast oil reserves and its potential to substitute for
Saudi Arabia as the market maker in the global oil exchange. Apart from
the Saudis, Iraq is the only country whose reserves are large enough that it
could regulate world prices by choosing to expand or contract production
at strategic points in the price cycle. This strategic value of Iraqi oil –
above and beyond its straight economic value – explains why, within one
month of capturing Baghdad, US overseers raised the prospect of pulling
Iraq out of the OPEC consortium. Control of Iraqi oil offers the potential
to exercise critical leverage over the economies of the Middle East, Russia,
China and other oil-dependent nations.
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For Lafer, the war on terror offers an economic opportunity for the dominate
powers in the world, at the expense of the Iraqi population. Military
interventions arrange global markets in beneficial ways for certain countries,
while destabilizing others. The war on terror does not challenge global economic
stability but instead further entrenches forms of economic control for certain
actors while exploiting others. Lafer concludes by describing the war on terror
as “neoliberalism by other means: what could not be achieved by trade or treaty
will be imposed by military force.”
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Others see the war on terror as a co-participating force in the larger global
economic trends. Christopher Hughes points to the ways in which globalization,
of the economic variety, contributes to and creates situations for the spread of
terrorism. He defines globalization through three functions, first as
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liberalization, then convergence, and finally as deterritorialization.

59

Liberalization lowers the borders through deepening cooperation around mutual
interests between independent nation-states. Convergence is the process of
political, social, and economic activities that take on broader global dimensions
beyond limited expressions of cultures. While the process of convergence
intends to go beyond cultural domination, in reality it often just expresses
dominant Westernized or Americanized interests. Finally, deterritorialization
changes and transforms social space, bringing people together regardless of
physical location and bypassing the rigidity of borders. By examining
globalization through this process Hughes articulates a contemporary world
unbounded by the organization of nations. While at one time nation-states
played an integral role in organizing markets, corporate interests, and territorial
integrity, they no longer do. Additionally, security evolves to meet the new
demands of a deterritorialized world no longer attached to a single nation, it now
protects international networks, often having to protect the nation-state from
globalization.
The shifting organization of the world results in new political identities
that challenge the nation-state often through direct confrontation and violence.
As Hughes writes:
[G]lobalisation has manifestly also facilitated the actual terrorist activities
of al-Qaeda. Globalisation, again in conjunction with the effects of
decolonisation and bipolorisation, has eroded the sovereignty of states,
and it is in the areas where the sovereign control of states is weakest –
most notably Afghanistan and Somalia – where terrorist networks have
accumulated. For such states are where the remit of the central
Christopher W. Hughes, “Reflections on Globalisation, Security and 9/11” in
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 15:3 (2010), 423.
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government often fails to run and where groups can practise illicit
activities relatively free from interference….Globalisation as economic
liberalisation and the transcendence of sovereign control over social
interaction, spurred on by improvements in transportation and
information technology, has enabled trans-national crime and terrorist
organisations to mimic the behaviour of transnational corporations
(TNC’s) and to move with greater ease across deregulated economic and
territorial spaces.
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Ulrich Beck, on the other hand, conceives of terror as an antithesis to the
globalized economic order, contrasting the liberal process with that of terror. Yet
terrorism, even for Beck, is not a pure economic negativity. Instead, it mimics
those neoliberal and globalized processes, but in a deformed and perverse form.
As he describes it:
With the horror images of New York, terror groups have with one blow
established themselves as new global actors in competition with states,
economies and civil societies. The terror networks have become ‘NGO’s
of violence’. They act like nongovernmental organizations: deterritorial
and decentralized; thus, on the one hand, local, on the other,
transnational. While, for example, Greenpeace has the lead in respect to
the environmental crisis and Amnesty International in respect to the
human rights crisis when contrasted with states, the terrorist NGO’s
repeal the monopoly on violence previously enjoyed by states. However,
this means, first, that this kind of transnational terrorism is not limited to
Islamic terrorism, but can associate itself with any possible aim, ideology
or fundamentalism; and, second, that one must differentiate between the
terror of national liberation movements, which are territorially and
nationally bound, and the new, transnational terrorist networks, which
are deterritorial – that is, beyond borders – and which as a result of their
actions depreciate with a single blow the national grammar of military
and war.
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Some themes appear similar between Hughes and Beck: for the former terrorism
arises because of globalized economic systems, where for the later terrorism
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undermines the globalized economic order but in a reciprocal mimicry of that
order.
Even more controversially, others imagine the neoliberal economic order
as a form of competing terrorism without the label. Vandana Shiva, a proponent
of such a radical view, expresses it this way:
Terrorism will not be stopped by militarized minds that create insecurity
and fear. The ‘war against terrorism’ will create a vicious cycle of
violence: It will not create peace and security. Terrorism can only be
stopped by cultures of peace, democracy, and people’s security. It is
wrong to define the conflict as a war between ‘civilization and barbarism’:
It is a war between two forms of terrorism that are mirror images. Both
sides can only conceive of monocultures that must erase diversity, the
very precondition for peace. They share the dominant culture of violence.
Both sides are clones of each other and their victims are innocent people
everywhere.
62

Shiva, unlike the others previously mentioned, sees no distinguishing and
essential separation between global economic forces and the forces of terrorism.
The only difference between al Qaeda and a Monsanto are the motivations. The
neoliberal order, with the power of state militaries, follow the same patterns of
violence and a desire to universalize their vision of the world that many terror
groups employ. Elsewhere Shiva writes about the way neoliberal forms of
power rooted in biopolitics grow into bioeconomies, where the market itself
seeks to shape and control life. The economy no longer looks only at renewable
resources like oil, but now seeks to control, augment, and privatize the very
processes of life. Using the example of intellectual rights over seeds by
companies like Monsanto, Shiva highlights the disparities between the
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developed and developing worlds through these novel and destructive
bioeconomies.
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Describing terror as a negative force on the economy ignores the realities
and nuances between the way terror and neoliberal forms of globalization
operate. Terrorism does not produce a negative economic impact, and as a
result, even as much as biopolitical governments may render terrorism as a
phenomenon to overcome, those governments rely on terror as a participant and
motivation for economic activities. Terrorism results in economic growth and
development, through the matrix of securitizing activities. Security, and the
process of securitization that rely on the biopolitical notions of inclusion and
exclusion at the border, and the management of populations, end up implicated
in the very thing it hopes to protect against. Biopolitics then cannot solve
terrorism as it participates, economically, in the activities of terror.
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Chapter Three: Violence, Religion, and Terror

Definitions from the previous chapter provided three ways of
understanding how contemporary neoliberal state actors, a variety of theorists,
and organizations frame definitions of terrorism. In addition, I showed the way
biopolitics inhabits and informs the first of these definitions: terrorism negatively
impacts economic productivity. By looking closely at the border and its role in
security, terrorism, and trade, one sees the paradoxical biopolitical demands of
simultaneous inclusion and exclusion, along with population management. In
addition to this framing of terror two others came from examining the
definitions: first, that terrorism is excessively violent, and second that perverse
religious passion motivates terror.
Most imagine terror involving bombs, gunfire, and attacks on innocent
civilians. Equating terror with violence does not provoke much disagreement,
but the nature and scope of violence can be a bit more complicated. In a video
released August of 2014 entitled, “A Message to America,” images interspersed
and spliced together depict a story of violence perpetrated by, and against, the
Islamic State. The video culminates in the beheading of James Foley by a man
who came to be known throughout popular culture and the media as “Jihadi
John.” In response to the video, then president Barrack Obama said the
following:
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The terrorist group known as ISIL must be degraded and ultimately
destroyed…In the most horrific crimes imaginable, innocent human
beings have been beheaded, with videos of the atrocity distributed to
shock the conscience of the world. No God condones this terror. No
grievance justifies these actions. There can be no reasoning – no
negotiation – with this brand of evil. The only language understood by
killers like this is the language of force. So the United States of American
will work with a broad coalition to dismantle this network of death.
1

David Cameron, also responding to the video stated:
We’ve all been shocked and sickened by the barbaric murder of American
journalist James Foley and by the voice of what increasingly seems to have
been a British terrorist recorded on that video. It was clear evidence – not
that any more was needed – that this is not some foreign conflict
thousands of miles from us that we can hope to ignore.
2

In a Washington Post article in 2014, Terrence McCoy explains the success of the
Islamic State through the spectacle of violence they employ. He writes,
[T]he acts of terror have been wildly successful. From beheadings to
summary executions to amputations to crucifixions, the terrorist group
has become the most feared organization in the Middle East. That fear,
evidenced in fleeing Iraqi soldiers and 500,000 Mosul residents, has
played a vital role in the group’s march toward Baghdad. In many cases,
police and soldiers literally ran, shedding their uniforms as they went,
abandoning large caches of weapons.
3

These responses share in their insistence of excessive and brutal violence
as a primary reason for the deployment of counterterrorism measures. Barbarity
and viciousness of the violence used by these groups prompts a response and
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elicits fear. While the beheading of journalists undoubtedly demands a response,
what is not clear is what makes the violence especially undue. Under what
metric can we measure violence and categorize it as either reasonable or not?
What essential quality allows for the determination of one thing as more or less
violent than another?
Terrorism certainly involves violence. To be terrifying requires violence,
as it needs to remind the victim of their fragility and vulnerability. All humans
instinctively react in extreme ways to images of burning, mutilation, beheadings,
dismemberments, and other such acts. However, defining terrorism entirely in
conjunction with violence raises serious questions about proportionate and
disproportionate responses. The actual statistical risk to the average citizen
shows that the attention given to terrorism as a potentiality might be exaggerated
in relation to the actuality of attacks. A report prepared for the State Department
of the U.S. found that during 2014 there were 13,463 unique global terrorist
attacks, with a total fatality of 32,727. However, of those 32,727 fatalities, 19%
(6,200) were the preparators of the attack. During the same year, the Center for
4

Disease Control shows the number of suicides in the United States alone at more
than 39,000 and homicides at 17,000. Only 36 of the fatalities of terrorism
5

occurred within the United States. The amount of attention given to terrorism,
both socially and politically, outweighs the raw number of victims, especially in
comparison to other violent activities.
START, Annex of Statistical Information: Country Reports on Terrorism 2014, June
2015.
4
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National Violent Death Reporting System, NVDRS.
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In contrast, Simone Molin Friis identifies the special nature of terroristic
violence not in the numbers but in the visual spectacle.

The sheer visibility of

the Islamic State in media and social media contributes to the sense of excessive
violence. This video, clearly displaying the beheading of a single human,
produced much higher visibility than other forms of violence that groups like IS
regularly utilize as part of their approach, even including other beheadings. Friis
writes of the James Foley video,
ISIS’s beheading videos are said to show that ISIS is unique in its brutality
and beyond anything we have ever seen. Yet this interpretation—
unfortunately—seems to have less to do with the actual frequency of this
form of violence and more with the way in which beheadings—and the
violence in Syria more generally—have tended to disappear from view, or
never appear at all, in the West. The exceptionality of ISIS is thus partly
established through a process in which ISIS’s beheadings are made
exceedingly visible across media platforms, whereas other similarly
gruesome acts of violence, including beheadings carried out by other
warring factions, are reduced to more marginal visual sites.
6

It does not appear that the visibility of death makes the videos special, so much
as the means of achieving the death. The video impacts the viewer not merely as
a depiction of the loss of life, but as a depiction of a particularly brutal act, and
the horrific nature of the act popularizes and makes visible the video. If the
violence were not striking in some way, the video would certainly be less
pervasive. Talal Asad observes something similar regarding suicide bombing:
Western reports of Tamil suicide bombers in Sri Lanka and even of the
many suicide bombers in occupied Iraq attacking fellow Iraqis do not
display the same horror—or evoke it in a Western audience. All of this

Simone Molin Friis, “’Beyond anything we have ever seen’: Beheading Videos
and the Visibility of the Violence in the War against ISIS,” International Affair:
91: 4(2015): 725-746.
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may be true, but still doesn’t tell us why horror is expressed, when it is
genuinely expressed, and what it consists in.
7

Asad then later describes horror as the consequence of violence that threatens
something more than the individual, such as a way of life, a community, or a
population. If horror comes about because of a threat to the way of life of some
8

people, then what specific “way of life” is threatened?
Blaming media saturation and a demand for elicit content on television
only provides for part of the explanation. The choices in content work both
ways: the consumer demands images of certain types of violence for reasons
beyond simply the media feeding them those images. The representations of
violence shown, in either reporting or entertainment, speak to the general
cultural attitudes of acceptable and unacceptable forms of violence. The way of
life Asad refers to defines, cultivates, and demands certain parameters on
violence either as acceptable to that way of life, or not.
Victims play an important part in this defining of the way of life,
particularly the methods for making decisions between victims and non-victims.
Using certain groups, such as a police force or military, allows for demarcating
lines within the social order between combatants and non-combatants. Shannon
French argues that the excessiveness of violence, beyond what a way of life
would consider appropriate, results from targeting specifically noncombatant

Talal Asad, On Suicide Bombing, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007),
67.
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victims. Of course, that way of life provides the lines between appropriate and
9

inappropriate targets, that others may or may not agree with.
Others argue terrorism does not require violence to be horrifying, as it
need only have, “the ultimate end of getting the subject to act in the particular
way the agent wants him to act.” Responses to fear make terrorism excessively
10

violent, not the actual victim or method of violence. In this case the victim plays
an important role, but only in so much as terrorism can target their potential
choices and behavior. Terrorism exists in the consequence of augmenting
decisions victims make about things like where to go for entertainment, about
which politicians to vote for, and about sentiments regarding foreign policy.

The Strategy of Violence:

Part of the problem with terroristic violence is the lack of justification.
Responses by victims often involve some plea for rationality for the atrocity,
indicating that the lack of strategic goals somehow makes the violence
particularly troubling. A Washington Post article from 2014 describes the general
conditions of the Islamic State:
Death was everywhere in the sacked city of Mosul, a strategically vital oil
hub and Iraq’s largest northern city. One reporter said an Iraqi woman in
Shannon E. French, “Murderers not Warriors: The Moral Distinction between
Terrorists and Legitimate Fighters in Asymmetric Conflicts,” in Terrorism and
International Justice, ed. J. Sterba (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 3146.
9

Liam Harte, “Must Terrorism be Violent?” in Torture, Terrorism, and the Use of
Violence, ed. Jeremy Wisnewski (Newcastle : Cambridge Scholars 2008), 111.
10
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Mosul claimed to have seen a ‘row of decapitated soldiers and policemen’
on the street. Other reports spoke of ‘mass beheadings,’ though the
Washington Post was not able to confirm the tales.
It later continues,
The stories, the videos, the acts of unfathomable brutality have become a
defining aspect of ISIS, which controls a nation-size tract of land and has
now pushed Iraq to the precipice of dissolution. Its adherents kill with
such abandon that even the leader of al-Qaeda has disavowed them.
‘Clearly, [leader Ayman] al-Zawahiri believes that ISIS is a liability to the
al-Qaeda brand,’ Aaron Zelin, who analyzes jihadist movements for the
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told The Washington Post’s Liz
Sly earlier this year.
11

Part of the profundity of violence relies on the senselessness of its use. Strategic
violence directed at some very specific goal in a direct confrontational struggle
makes sense and can be justified, for example, conflict for the sake of a politically
magnanimous end transforms suffering into a tragic necessity. However, the
violence utilized by the Islamic State appears to lack such clearly defined goals
and merely revels in violence for the sake of violence.
Some argue that excessive violence is the strategy. Hassan Hassan, an
analyst at the Delma Institute and expert on the Islamic State argues that the
group regularly seeks out repulsive forms of violence for a variety of strategic
reasons. Fatwas issued on the public immolation of the Jordanian pilot Muadh
al-Kasasbeh justify the extreme violence as a potential deterrent to other enemies.
He explains,
the Jordanian’s capture provided a huge opportunity for it to humiliate
the international coalition and send a strong message to Muslim countries
participating in it. ISIS recognised that the act would alienate some
Muslims, but believes it will deter many more. What ISIS gains from
violence, it calculates, trumps any losses in popularity. This strategy was
Terrence McCoy, “ISIS, Beheadings and the Success of Horrifying Violence,”
The Washington Post, June 13, 2014.
11

105

similar to the one followed by the group’s founding father, Abu Musab alZarqawi, himself a Jordanian, when he set the precedent of filming the
slaughtering of an American captive, Nick Berg, in 2004. The killing,
which the CIA said was carried out by al-Zarqawi, won him the nickname
“the Sheikh of the Slaughterers” by fellow jihadists.
12

However, viewing violence as the strategy might ignore some of the other
internal justifications for that violence by prioritizing the external response
(deterrent). Chetan Bhatt from the London School of Economics emphasizes the
theological motivations for acts of violence, aside from purely political forms.
He contrasts an instrumental view, which attempts to rationalize the violence
within political and ideological intentions, against an internal theological view.

13

Attempts to give meaning to violence, particularly political, may say more
about those defining the violence than those perpetrating acts of ferocity.
Focusing on the instrumental function of violence highlights some of the hyperinstrumentalization endemic to the biopolitical state. Considerable advancement
in capabilities for violence by biopolitical states, produce new uncontained
possibilities for those technologies of violence to be used against those states.
The increased production and use of drones, for example, has created a situation
where those same technologies are regularly employed by a variety of groups.
The more knowledge gained on how to destroy bodies the more awareness of
human biological fragility. Tensions then increase over the conceptions of
14
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violence, and the appropriateness of violence, by and with governments
purportedly concerned with the flourishing of life. However, violence exists at
the heart of these biopolitical states.
The neoliberal order, which promotes biopolitical measures to diminish
violence through political means, requires a foundational act of violence at the
heart of the political order itself. States maintain a threat of violence against
those who would oppose this new code and order. Resistance may arise against
the legal order in time, both collective and individual, but the law must remain
intact for the maintenance of that founded political order. Threats against that
foundational violence require permanent possibilities of retribution, while states
must simultaneously confront and negotiate with a variety of new conditions in
the overall legal landscape.

New demands of justice require that the law

constantly consider these new conditions and find any new modes of organizing
and promoting legal order. Justice sits outside the law, as the law never quite
reaches the fullness of the possibilities of justice, as some new condition may
always come about that upends the previous idea of justice.

15

Like justice, violence comes from outside the law, first as the foundation
of that legal order, and then as the demands for progress. Violence visits and
haunts the legal order, serving as a tool to remedy parts of the law that demand
remedy, without nullifying the entire process. But the threat to nullify and then
enact a completely new legal order through violence remains a continual
possibility. Additionally, some forms of violence can also exist in a purely
Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law,” in Acts of Religion, (New York: Routledge,
2002), 250.
15
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narcissistic form, outside the search for justice or a new political order, and
instead as a means toward self-gratification. For example, a murder committed
in an act of selfish revenge, or the violent robbery of some institution for financial
gain.
Regardless of the violence for the sake of justice, or violence for merely
narcissistic gain, the law eventually takes up and uses that violence, folding it
into its institutions in response and maintenance of the social order. Violence has
political usefulness: like the economically positive responses to terrorism,
violence can serve productive aims within the biopolitical state. At the very
foundation of social contract theory Hobbes insists on the productive aspects of
violence to, “conform the wills of them all to peace at home and mutual aid
against their enemies abroad.” The militia under the control of the sovereign
16

functions as the most important institute of social order, further indicating the
essential quality of sovereignty is the monopoly on violence. Rousseau similarly
17

envisions violence as a productive potential recourse for those who would
otherwise ignore the order of the law. Though unlike Hobbes, Rousseau does
not centralize violence under one authority, but disperses it across the entire
body population calling all to arms should need arise. Even Thomas Paine in
18

his suspicion of governance admits that violence may be used to remedy
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individuals lacking moral virtue and to prevent a threat by those individuals to
the order of the law.

19

The founding of the order of the law on violence and the subsequent
maintenance of that law through the continued threat of violence does not
monolithically dictate appropriate and inappropriate uses of violence. For
example, appropriate violence looks radically different through the
anthropologies of Locke and Hobbes. In Hobbes’ account, humans in a
“natural” state were constantly at war with each other and, as a result,
perpetually fragile and at risk. The sovereign, with the exclusive rights to enact
violence, does so to ward off any uprising of the state of nature and all the
violence that comes with it. Locke, on the other hand, imagines a blissful state of
nature where humans existed in perpetual natural freedom. The violence of the
state only serves to protect the good of that freedom from those who would seek
to harm it. After the foundational threat, the order that comes forth retroactively
makes sense of the state of nature, giving meaning to it, and the violence that
ruptured it and substantiated the new legal order. The law and the peace it
brings makes sense out of the violence of its own inception, articulating its own
meaning of violence and justifying that foundational violence through an
instrumental explanation for violence both primordial and continual.
This process of violence and its own justification is remarkably analogous
to the theological concept of the miracle. By erupting through a decision by the
sovereign God, countering the establishment of natural law, the miracle appears
Thomas Paine, Common Sense: On the Origin and Design of Government. (Ohio:
Coventry House Publishing, 2016).
19
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like an exterior violent act. But external eruption alone does not make it a
miracle; in addition, the miracle must provide some larger lesson regarding the
metaphysical world. It must make meaning of the power over death and
sickness, the fragility of the human condition, or the unconditional love of God.
Failure to provide some lesson or instill some idea of power results in it not
being a miracle, but merely a disturbance. The law with its demands and
prohibitions must also provide some explanatory and justifying power for its
role in the life of the citizen. If it fails to produce meaning out of its
establishment and break with a previous order, it fails to be the law.
Violence and the establishment of the law can only make sense in the
biopolitical epoch as a measure for sustaining life. Violence can only be used for
the protection of life, otherwise it is meaningless and falls outside, as something
unacceptable in its lack of instrumental value. Only within this framework of
demanding profound instrumental violence for the protection of life can wars
against objects (drugs, poverty, terrorism) have meaning.
Terrorism is a problem of biopolitics and not for biopolitics, because
terrorism uses the foundational model of violence central to the biopolitical state,
but in the most perverse way. It terrifies the biopolitical state through
enactments of violence in non-instrumental forms. Any strategies that do exist
within terrorism are not grounded in seeking out a new code of law, and
therefore cannot be recognized as appropriate violence. No meaning can be
made of the violence by the biopolitical state because it uses the very
foundational act of the peaceful state in a reciprocal form, resisting all attempts
then to define terroristic violence with any instrumental value. But by doing this
110

terrorism exposes something in biopolitics. By denying terrorism meaning
within an instrumental system it also admits its own violent foundation even as
it insists on the preservation of life. Terrorism exposes the fundamental lie of
biopolitics, that it cannot fulfill its intended goal as it relies on the disrupted core
of death and violence as its center.

Religious Fervor:

Finally, some of the attempts to outline terror rely on explanations
focusing on extreme and passionate religious conviction gone awry. The
biopolitical state allows for religious devotion, but only within certain
parameters that terror fundamentally and irrevocably falls outside of. This view
relies on a firm distinction between not only a religious and secular divide, but
within the religious, proper and improper forms of devotion.
The distinction between the religious and secular are difficult to maintain
particularly when considered in conjunction with the ongoing war on terror.
Bruce Lincoln demonstrates this in his side by side readings of Osama bin Laden
and George Bush’s responses to 9/11. Both responses rely on a set of theological
claims, and justify violence through religious idea of friends and enemies. For
both a divide between political adversaries relies on a divide between the
metaphysical categories of good and evil, providing a transcendentally
established, but imminently fixed, line between victims and perpetrators. This
20
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flavor of binary religious language finds its way into a variety of discussion on
terrorism beyond Bush and bin Laden alone, particularly when terrorism often
blatantly attaches itself to religious symbols.

While not overt, this binary

thinking itself undergirds Samuel Huntington’s idea of our new age marked by
the clash of civilizations. Politics and ideology are slowly eroding, replaced
instead by civilizational divides. Religious ideas take up residence deep within
the histories of these civilizations.

21

Since the time that Huntington wrote this in the 1990’s the general climate
today envisions more deeply a version of radical Islam in opposition to global
civilization. My point is not so much to argue in support or against Huntington’s
clash of civilization theory, instead I contend that modern forms of secular
neoliberalism rely on a theological paradigm, and this paradigm appears
particularly vulnerable to terrorism.
While secular systems may rely on religious ideas, it is equally the case
that religious thinking often relies on images of political power and violence. In
an article for Christianity Today, author Timothy George shows how Augustine’s
response to the attack on Rome by Alaric and his followers resonates with
contemporary terrorism, going so far as to compare Alaric with Osama bin
Laden. George warns against the equation of any political state with the
22

sovereign Kingdom of God, as each complement each other but are not the same.
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Immanent political institutions have a finite amount of authority established by
the infinite authority of God. George also offers some distinctions between
Christian and Islamic theology on the issue, even if the proposed focus of the
article is terrorism at large, and not rooted to any specific religious organization.
God provides a sense of ultimate security which terrorism attempts to undo, but
cannot, because true security lies in an infinite and not finite source. The
attempt to render the world infinitely open to security, the explicit goal of the
biopolitical takes shape within early Christian theological demands on political
meaning.
This theological impetus drives a wedge in the world between light and
dark. Julie Ioffe, in Foreign Policy, argues that this “Manichean” wedge motivates
and produces religious terrorism in a variety of groups. If the world becomes
23

subject to such divisions, violence appears an inevitable outcome of protecting
the light from the intrusion of the dark.
Ioffe draws focus upon an important element within the work of religious
violence. Violence may relate to religion different ways. First, violence can be
rooted in an overt religious narrative. Religious teachings important to a group
may focus upon the violent images within the larger mythological system, and as
a result call for specific violent actions in response to these teachings.
Alternatively, a person may merely belong to a religious organization and
commit acts of violence completely detached from the teachings of that group.
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In either case, violence does serve a function in the larger mythological systems
of religion.
Both Rene Girard and Walter Burkert provide examples of a larger body
of theory that seeks to explain the apparent pervasiveness of violence in religious
narratives and mythology. Both focus upon the ways in which sacrifice appears
in religious thought. For Burkert sacrifice resonates with deep primordial drives
to connect life and death. Affirmations of life appear out of the violent sacrifice,
24

particularly as what was sacrificed nourishes and continues life. By looking at
25

things like the practices of communion and Greek ideas of sacrifice, Burkert
shows the ways death sustains and supports life. Killing for the sake of sacrifice
symbolically frames the biologically pragmatic act of killing. The killing of small
animals as a way of warding off evil spirits mimics the biological act of offering a
predator an alternative meal through another, smaller animal. The practice of
sacrifice involves,
active killing. The victim-to-be saves himself by becoming a killer in turn.
In a way, this doubles the protection to be achieved, both assuaging and
threatening the putative aggressor, in a practice that is most strongly felt
to be efficacious.
26

Taking power over the natural world through the enactment of death informs the
logic of the supernatural world, still demanding death to preserve life:
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In the situation of the herd vis-à-vis the carnivore – the zebras attacked by
lions – when one individual is killed, the others feel safe for a time. The
instinctive program seems to command: take another one, not me. This
ancient program is still at work in humans, still fleeing from devouring
dangers and still making sacrifices to assuage and triumph over anxiety.
In this perspective sacrifice is a construct of sense that has proved almost
universally effective throughout the history of civilization.
27

Rene Girard offers a similar concept of religious violence through his
often cited “scapegoat theory.” Scapegoating relies on a mimetic anthropology
that Girard outlines in Violence and the Sacred, stating that violence only occurs in
response to the presence of a rival. Contrary to initial analysis, the rival does not
compete for a single object which then must be decided through violent
confrontation. Instead, the rival desires an object and through that desire
establishes that object as valuable. As Girard describes it:
The rival desires the same object as the subject, and to assert the primacy
of the rival can lead to only one conclusion. Rivalry does not arise because
of the fortuitous convergence of two desires on a single object; rather, the
subject desires the object because the rival desires it. In desiring an object
the rival alerts the subject to the desirability of the object. The rival, then,
serves as a model for the subject, not only in regard to such secondary
matters as style and opinions but also, and more essentially, in regard to
desires.
28

Desiring any object and competition for an object all rely on a mimetic
relationship between humans, where we repeat the actions, motivations, and
passions of others.
Only by understanding the mimetic anthropology can one understand the
functional elements of his scapegoat theory. The relationship of rivalry produces
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an ambiguous self-identity as both the same as the rival, and fundamentally
different from the rival. Desiring what the rival desires makes the two alike.
However, they both want the object and the finite nature of the object makes
them different. Elsewhere, Girard connects the issue of ambiguous self-identity
with the large scale social persecution of certain groups. At both the individual
and the social levels the inability to control the different conflicts that arise over
the object demands a set of solutions. Introducing the sacred figure into the
sacrificial act offers a solution:
Sacrifice plays a very real role in these societies, and the problem of
substitution concerns the entire community. The victim is not a substitute
for some particularly endangered individual, nor is it offered up to some
individual of particularly bloodthirsty temperament. Rather, it is a
substitute for all the members of the community, offered up by the
members themselves. The sacrifice serves to protect the entire community
from its own violence; it prompts the entire community to choose victims
outside itself. The elements of dissension scattered throughout the
community are drawn to the person of the sacrificial victim and
eliminated, at least temporarily, by its sacrifice.
29

Burkert shares with Girard some elements of the scapegoat theory, as it
functions in much the same way as his idea of offering up a part of something to
protect the larger whole. But for Girard the scapegoat establishes the identity of
the victim as unclean or guilty justifying the violence visited upon them. Burkert
points out the way in which that victim may be “despised and worshipped at the
same time.” In this moment of ambivalence it may happen that memory and
30

memorial come to be an element of the violence in that “gratefully we honor
their memory, and make sure to remain attached to the tales recalling those
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thrilling events. Ritual language prevails in this context: there are victims, there
is sacrifice.”

31

For both, violence serves an instrumental function within the scope of the
religious system and larger mythological structures. Burkert insists that
violence carries forward, very literally, the continuation of life; while for Girard,
violence sustains the peacefulness and functionality of the social order. Legal
structures, as has been shown, provide justification for violence. In addition,
within the religious order violence has a similar functional role. While Burkert
and Girard share their views of violence possessing instrumental value, they are
both helpful in articulating the ways religious violence interfaces with
biopolitics. Violence serves a purpose of continuing life in each, and violence
utilized by terrorists calls into question this continuation of life. Terror brings
death back inside a system that expunged it through the instrumentalization of
religious violence. Biopolitics, unlike terror, always seeks to hide violence under
the cover of efficacy.

Biopolitics, Violence and Religion

Whether politically or religiously justified, biopolitical states demand
functional and instrumental violence. Terrorism, on the other hand, contradicts
that instrumental demand and instead makes a spectacle out of violence. Death
was at one time a spectacle, but that has since changed as death is increasingly
private and hidden away by a political system that insists on the preservation of
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life. Justifiable violence becomes synonymous with sterility, efficiency, and
silence; rarely drawing attention to itself. Reversing this, terrorism makes death
startlingly visible. As Achille Mbembe describes,
In a context in which decapitation is viewed as less demeaning than
hanging, innovations in the technologies of murder aim not only at
‘civilizing’ the way of killing. They also aim at disposing of larger number
of victims in a relatively short span of time. At the same time, a new
cultural sensibility emerges in which killing the enemy of the state is an
extension of play. More intimate, lurid, and leisurely forms of cruelty
appear.
32

Biopolitics entails a certain justification for violence and a certain style of
violence. Paul Virilio details the forms of violence in the contemporary state.
Battlefields no longer rely on local experiences and interpretations of the
strategies for combat as increasing uses of technology and digital representation
of an ongoing war provide more accurate readings of the success or failure of
strategies. In this reality images are more important than lived realities. Due to
33

the ubiquitous presence of digitizing technologies, cameras, and media
interpretations of images, representations of violence are easily reproduced.
Because of this ease of reproduction, local knowledges, objects, and experiences
are rapidly vanishing, replaced by non-unique reproduced digital images.
The process of disintegrating local realities and experiences not only
occurs in wars and battles, but these images and the loss of locality takes place on
a global scale. For Virilio, globalization reduces and erases the local for the sake
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of a globalized image and scaled pervasive gaze. Transitioning into a fully
34

globalized reality forces the individual to witness reality through a mediation of
images and digitized reality that overtake local realities. Considering life caught
in the circulation of images helps in understanding the role of terroristic violence.
Some images, as Virilio points out, generate and produce fear in the viewer. In a
35

world saturated by images to make something noteworthy it must produce a
spectacle of novelty, otherwise it would be lost in the sea of circulated images.
Violence must stand out in some way for it to produce the intended fear:
The apparatus that manufactured this phantom of threat is a complex
network of institutional authority with each node looking to expand or
consolidate its power. Each piece in the network does not necessarily
need be in collusion with any other piece. Each needs only to see
possibility, and act accordingly, knowing that fear is one the most
exchangeable and profitable signs in political economy. (Even the slowest
of bureaucracies act quickly in its presence). Since all parties involved
have a stake in taking their fantasy for reality and turning the most
improbable into the most probable, the manufacturing process is nearly
frictionless, and the rewards are tremendous.
36

Fear coupled with the instability of globalization justifies retributive violence by
the state for the protection of the species. However, beyond this justification
through fear and protection, biopolitical violence affirms life of one sort, even as
it deals death. If the biopolitical state can successfully reproduce fear, or meet
terror with the terror of “shock and awe campaigns,” then it may deter future
violence and end a war before it even begins. At the same time, state violence
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demands secrecy and efficiency, never reveling in the spectacle of gore but
instead in the cold calculations of wars fought through drones and computer
simulations. Terroristic violence exposes the struggle and competition over the
power of the image, and in doing so biopolitical states betray their own internal
logic regarding violence.
To justify violence, it must be useful; if it fails to affirm life and protect the
species, then violence appears as unjustifiable. Terrorism disrupts by using
violence completely lacking in usefulness. This lack of usefulness makes the
spectacle of violence special and unique relative to biopolitical violence. It is not
more violent in the raw numbers of those killed or injured, but it stands out
against forms of violence that emphasize cold calculations and war from a
distance. Terrorism, quite unlike biopolitical violence, embodies a lack of
efficiency, and because of this inefficiency appears as a spectacle. The Islamic
State’s use of beheading, for example, is not an efficient way of enacting death on
an enemy. It requires time, energy, and exertion that a drone or bomb does not,
and limits the numbers of casualties to the number of people one can behead.
The process is slow, tedious, and brutal. Certainly, a drone strike would produce
more victims, but it lacks the visceral reality and intimacy with the body.
Swords exude overt inefficiency in the modern world, and they bring into stark
focus the fragility and permeability of the body. Terroristic violence uselessly
engages in inefficient forms of violence, and this useless inefficiency makes it
terrifying.
Terrorists know they cannot hope to defeat the overwhelming might of
states, and as a result they seek violence of a different sort. By increasing the
120

symbolic aspects of violence terrorists increase the repetition of the images of
violence, and produce more fear in response to the horrific and pervasive image.
Kiarina Kordela demonstrates effectively the way suicide bombings engage in
this struggle over the image with the biopolitical state. For her suicide bombings
become “part and parcel of biopower.”

37

She first articulates terrorism as rooted in the production of horror, but
horror for Kordela is a non-discursive, or pre-discursive, reaction to some event,
falling outside the sphere of human activities fixed in the production of
discourse. She relies on classic definitions of the human as uniquely discursive
and rational, and horror produces something outside the boundaries of rational
engagement. Language cannot adequately encapsulate the raw and bare reality
of sheer terror, and can only be met with a scream. Horror, to be truly horrific,
must exclude thought.
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Kordela cites the work of Jacqueline Rose, who argues suicide bombings
are troubling precisely because they cannot be understood in rational political
and social terms. While such tactics kill far fewer people than other forms of
violence, they do produce remarkable intimacy between the perpetrator and the
victim, thereby producing more terror. By dying and suffering alongside the
victims, and without gaining any political, financial, or social reward, the suicide
bomber brings into a tight unity the victims to him or herself. The fearful
response to such attacks
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stems partly from the unbearable intimacy shared in their final moments
by the suicide bomber and her or his victims. Suicide bombing is an act of
passionate identification – you take the enemy with you in a deadly
embrace.
39

Horror lacks any formal linguistic or discursive arrangement, and therefore
cannot be adequately expressed in political terminology. The conditions by
which someone recognizes something as horrific may have discursive and
political origins, but the response remains beyond language.
Kordela accentuates the inexplicability of horror and the prohibition
against offering explanations in Rose’s theories on suicide bombings. Terrorism
produces something that fundamentally cannot be explained, and the political
elites in the west, try as they may, cannot theorize away the truth of raw terror
and horror as a response to the attacks. Making an act of violence subject to
explanation, usefulness, instrumentality and thereby justification demarcates a
line between a life worthy of protection and a life which is unworthy, or in
Foucault’s biopolitical terminology, a divide of biological racism. Kordela writes
of this division:
The incitement to horror is a discursive mechanism that aims at the
construction of a racial divide between humans and non- or subhumans
around the criterion of the presence or absence of, precisely, horror. And the
‘monstrous’ designates that which (perhaps an admixture of childhood,
madness, and sanctity?) must be met with horror.
40

The contours of racism for Foucault ultimately provide the criteria for
justification of violence. If the political system which focuses upon the protection
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and sustaining of life needs violence to sustain that life, then violence may be
enacted. The victims of that protective biopolitical violence must be separate
from that life that violence seeks to protect. This form of biological racism
41

changes over time, from the Nazi program to the Cold War, but it remains, for
Foucault, detached from ethnic forms of racism. It exceeds the petty racial
divisions between ethnicities, and instead makes a deeper racial divide at the
center of the species. The reality of who falls on which side of that divide
depends on unpredictable historical movements, transitions, and ruptures.
Kordela offers a new articulation of this dividing line between the human
and subhuman, a line not drawn on ideological grounds, but a “division that
falls between what can be at all discursively apprehended, and what cannot (or
must not) and is instead supposed to elicit a purely affective reaction: horror.”
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The monstrous image of the terrorist fulfills a need embedded in the biopolitical
system. This system needs horror because it gives meaning to the construction of
the racial line between the human and subhuman. Terrorism performs a
necessary biopolitical function in its providing something beyond language and
political rationality that supports the very dividing line at the center of worthy
and unworthy life.
Turning to psychoanalysis and the concepts of repression and foreclosure,
Kordela shows why biopolitics cannot discursively apprehend the violence of
terrorism. Repression and foreclosure function similarly to signification, as
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repression occurs because of some signifier and returns as a coded signifier the
analyst and individual must de-code to understand the source of the repression.
Foreclosure, on the other hand, does not return as signification but as an act
against life, acting as a defense mechanism so that the original repressed
signification cannot be decoded. In a similar way, biopolitics does not wish to
43

uncover and decode the original signification of foundational violence of the law.
Terrorism functions in the exact same form:
I see the key to answering this question in the fact that, once we view
suicide bombing as part and parcel of biopower, we cannot overlook a
striking paradox at its core: the fact that it strives for a better life through
an act that disregards not only the life of the victim but also that of the
perpetrator – in short, all life. In suicide bombing the biopolitical goal of
improving life passes through a moment at which life is treated as
superfluous. Suicide bombing is the point at which it is revealed that the
universal principle of biopolitics (life as object and objective) may also be
based on its own exception (the superfluity of life). At first sight, one
might actually be tempted to ascribe a kind of ‘natural’ affinity between
suicide bombing and the ‘monstrous’ precisely because, however
biopolitical its goal may be its means treat life as superfluous.
44

Kordela takes her analysis one step further, connecting suicide bombing to
the larger activities and logic of biopower. By looking carefully at the internal
justifications for violence by terrorist groups, she points out that many do not
commit such atrocities out of strict religious piety. Religion only factors in as a
response to more pervasive problems with the conditions of life experienced by
the terrorist. Terrorists justify their use of violence by envisioning death as a
better option than the continuation of life here and now, under these political,

43

Ibid., 201.

44

Ibid., 202.
124

social, and economic conditions. She connects the motivations of suicide
bombing with biopolitics, writing,
It follows that, by aiming at better conditions of life, the strategy of suicide
bombing is itself biopolitical. The fact that life, and a better life, is the
primary objective is a biopolitical principle that today transcends not only the
distinction between Islam and the West but also the distinction between religion
and secularity, and it is shared globally. The so-called monstrosity of suicide
bombing is not an exception to, but part and parcel of biopower.
45

This claim may reach a bit too far, as many suicide bombers and terrorists
likely engage in violence for reasons other than the unbearable qualities of life,
but her ideas remain instrumental in showing the way terroristic violence serves
a thoroughly biopolitical end, bringing back into focus the central claim that
biopolitics cannot solve the problem of terrorism. However, her argument
remains convincing and relevant without the claim to a universal pursuit of a
better life in some metaphysical transcendental world beyond death. I find that
the complete lack of any goal, even one beyond this world, provides more horror
in the act. By providing some meaning for the motivations of terror, Kordela
seems to work against her insistence on the non-discursive realities of horror.
The real problem for horror and terrorism lies in the complete inefficient and
meaninglessness of it. The moment meaning enters, even in the form of
desperation in the face of this life, some element of horror is lost. Terrorism can
only be horrific when it profoundly lacks meaning, lacks explanation, and lacks
articulation.
Terrorism reveals, in its enactment of meaningless and inefficient violence,
the paradox at the center of biopolitics. The racial division creates the political
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criteria and justification for that which becomes the exception in Agamben’s
work. Not as mere idea or philosophical component of politics, but as actual real
bodies who violence can visit with racial justification. Racism defines certain
bodies as exceptional and subject to violence for protective reasons. Even the
death of innocent civilians can be justified if the racial component maintains a
line of distinction to all members of a given population. This line must continue
forth, as it does not merely justify violence, but supports the entire biopolitical
program. The primary and primordial act of the exception, between the friend
and the enemy, the foundational violence that establishes the law, and terrorism
all connect through their mutual pre-discursive, pre-juridical, pre-political
moment. The core of biopolitics (all politics) rests on a moment of exception, of a
division between the natural and the civil, of bare life and political life. But this
exception, and the violence of its inception at its inception, remains prediscursive. It can only be given political and discursive meaning after its
establishment and in retrospect. In this way, it shares a strong relationship and
correlation with the natural affective element that Kordela relies upon. Violence
under the sovereign, and later the biopolitical racial exception, can always be
justified but only by ultimate recourse to a pre-discursive and pre-political
foundational violence.
Terrorism brings to the surface affective pre-discursive and pre-political
violence. It reminds the biopolitical order, with its meticulous safety plans,
emergency broadcasts, FEMA, Department of Homeland Security, etc. that all
justifications for violence and protection of life remain thoroughly dependent
upon a pre-political violence that insists on the superfluity of life.
126

Terrorism is a problem of biopolitics in that, like Kordela insists, it is part
and parcel of biopolitics. It relates in a fundamental way to biopolitical violence,
not in its seeking a “better life” even through the eradication of life, but that it
uses violence without meaning. Symbolic forms of violence like beheading and
suicide bombing utilize the most inefficient means of enacting violence from the
perspective of contemporary military engagement. If it utilized the modern
forms of warfare for some presupposed political purpose it would, by its very
nature, cease to be terrorism. It would be violence certainly, but a violence
which could be accounted for. Instead, terrorism is a violence that can never be
accounted for and is in a perpetual state of competition with the biopolitical
state, each falling short of really capturing terrorism. Terrorism is terrifying, it is
a certain type of violence, because it is a violence which biopolitics cannot, and
does not want to, give an account. It does not want to account for it because at
the very core of its own exceptional justification it cannot account for its own
enactment violence in the exact same way.

127

Chapter Four: Conclusion: Terrorism as Heresy

Terrorism is a problem of biopolitics and not for biopolitics. The inability
by biopolitical regimes to disavow the religious center contributes to the basic
ineffectualness of the larger biopolitical neoliberal project in dealing with
terrorism. I have previously shown the ways that biopolitics uses religious
features in its own constructions of power, dominance, and political institutions.
However, in doing so it disavows those religious inclinations in favor of a
broader secularized focus upon life. As a result, the power of sovereignty does
not lie in the ordainment of individual leadership by a divine being. Political
figures derive their legitimacy from consent, as opposed to divine decree.
Instead, the focus and object of biopolitics is the secularized condition of life,
abstracted from religious and metaphysical explanation. In this abstracted life,
biopolitics covers over its internal religious mechanisms, hiding them from view.
Terrorism brings back into focus otherwise hidden and concealed features
of biopolitics. First, it makes obvious the economic progress that happens as a
response to terrorism. Neoliberal states wage wars against terror, yet rely on
terror as a part of the economic progress of globalization. The massive
investments into security infrastructure, biometrics, and border protections
indicate the underlying economic growth made possible by the very thing
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neoliberal biopolitical states unite resistance against, under the name of a race
war. If biopolitics could solve the problem of terrorism in some final way,
economics would undergo radical shifts in remedying those lost investments into
processes of securitization.
More importantly, biopolitics cannot solve terrorism because terrorism
betrays the inner metaphysical and religious tendencies endemic to biopolitics.
First, it makes visible the violence foundations of the state, a state that declares as
its central motivation, peace. It reminds the biopolitical regime of its own
reliance upon violence, and exposes the justifications for violence as grounded in
efficiency, precision, and instrumentality. Even more so, terrorism provides a
robust and amorphous enemy by which the racial war, crucial to the biopolitical
impetus to protect the species is required. Without terrorism, the edifice of the
biopolitical demand to wage species protective war would crumble, leaving
nothing but the raw exposed center foundational violence, rooted in the logic of
sacrifice.
Defining, investigating, and critically analyzing terrorism within the
larger context of biopolitics demands attention to the religious elements of the
ongoing struggle and clash of universalisms. As I argued in the last chapter,
religion and violence overlap in their mutual demands of instrumentality,
something terrorism flagrantly violates. However, this violation of the
instrumental demand of biopolitics does not leave terroristic motivations
completely devoid of religious material. Internally, terrorist organizations may
use religious ideas to justify, motivate, or demand violence. Looking at two
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movements, the Islamic State and the Christian Identity movement demonstrates
this reality.
Graeme Wood, in his lengthy article for The Atlantic, outlines a convincing
argument that the actions of the Islamic State cannot be understood detached
from their radical Islamic interpretation. Many within terrorist studies disregard
the genuine theological underpinnings of the actions by the Islamic State, often
accusing them of being an artificial or perverted religious form. Wood, on the
other hand, insists on a deep and nuanced theological engagement, even if that
engagement produces horrific consequences. The failure to appreciate and
isolate the theological impetus embedded in the Islamic State comes from two
tendencies in the West. First, the West often imagines “Jihad” as a monolithic
endeavor, applying the same logic that al Qaeda employs to this new group that
moves beyond those messages and ideas. Additionally, the West overlooks the
1

striking medieval religious nature of the Islamic State.
One of the primary distinguishing characteristics missed by the west’s
description of the IS is the failure to appreciate the centrality of the Caliphate. By
relying on the motivations of al Qaeda in their focus upon the distant enemy,
Western descriptions of the IS fail to seriously consider their goal of establishing
an internal, functioning, and robust Islamic kingdom. This Caliphate has two
elements. First, it is undoubtedly a political exercise in its forming laws,
regulations, prohibitions, and basic organizational institutions. Second, it is
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religious in nature in the demands of worship and spiritual accountability of its
actual and potential citizenry.
Wood provides three primary points of religious and spiritual
accountability rooted in the establishment of the Caliphate. First, the kingdom
demands devotion from would-be citizens. One must be a Muslim as an initial
requirement to participate in this new kingdom. As a result, the U.S., along with
other Western countries, do not present the greatest threat to the purity of the
kingdom. Rather, al Baghdadi and other members of the Caliphate consider
Muslims who fail to fully adhere to the harsh theological requirements of the
Islamic State the greatest enemy. Leadership engages in the regular
admonishment of certain Muslims and Islamic sects, declaring those outside the
boundaries of the IS as heretics. Codes of purity and orthodox belief within the
Islamic State demand much from adherents, as Wood describes the heightened
regulatory practices:
Denying the holiness of the Koran or the prophecies of Muhammad is
straightforward apostasy. But Zarqawi and the state he spawned take the
position that many other acts can remove a Muslim from Islam. These
include, in certain cases, selling alcohol or drugs, wearing Western clothes
or shaving one’s beard, voting in an election – even for a Muslim
candidate – and being lax about calling other people apostates. Being a
Shiite, as most Iraqi Arabs are, meets the standard as well, because the
Islamic State regards Shiism as innovation, and to innovate on the Koran
is to deny its initial perfection. (The Islamic State claims that common
Shiite practices, such as worship at the graves of imams and public selfflagellation, have no basis in the Koran or in the example oft he Prophet.)
That means roughly 200 million Shia are marked for death. So too are the
heads of state of every Muslim country, who have elevated man-made law
above Sharia by running for office or enforcing laws not made by God.
2

2

Ibid., 9.
131

Second, the rigid theological demands of leadership over the Caliphate appear
impossibly stringent, yet al Bagdhadi still claims legitimate leadership over this
kingdom. His role as leader does not derive from charisma or political power
alone, but a robust theological claim predicated on precise understanding of
Sunni law. These requirements are that the leader must be an adult male seen by
the community as a moral guide, having integrity, and possessing religious
authority. The kingdom must possess some territory to establish its rule, and the
ruler must be from the genealogical line of the Prophet Muhammad. Third, the
Islamic State presents a profoundly complicated and idiosyncratic apocalyptic
vision, in which they play a primary role. In Woods words:
The Islamic State differs from nearly every other current jihadist
movement in believing that it is written into God’s script as a central
character. It is in this casting that the Islamic State is most boldly
distinctive from its predecessors, and clearest in the religious nature of its
mission.
3

Demands of devotion and adherence by the Islamic State differ from other
terrorist and Islamist political organizations in their expressed lack of attention to
bringing about yet another political situation, instead they focus on the bringing
about of the actual end of the world. It is this apocalyptic narrative that makes IS
so different from other jihadist organizations.
This apocalyptic and earth shattering goal, while certainly dramatic,
provides helpful insights into the activities and strategies of the IS. Discerning
apocalyptic tendencies in the organization produces tangible strategies for
Western states in the ongoing struggle against the Islamic State’s hold on the
region. Fighting this organization demands a different set of tactics than those
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previously used with other terrorist groups, even groups that share some
theological notions. As Wood explains:
Al-Qaeda is ineradicable because it can survive, cockroach-like, by going
underground. The Islamic State cannot. If it loses its grip on its territory
in Syria and Iraq, it will cease to be a caliphate. Caliphates cannot exist as
underground movements, because territorial authority is a requirement:
take away its command of territory, and all those oaths of allegiance are
no longer binding. Former pledges could of course continue to attack the
West and behead their enemies, as freelancers. But the propaganda value
of the caliphate would disappear, and with it the supposed religious duty
to jihad.
4

Like the Islamic State, many recognize the Christian Identity movement
less for the theological nuances and more for their overt acts of violence. The
bombing of the Oklahoma City Federal building, the terrifying routine of mail
bombs by Ted Kaczysnki, the shooting in 1998 at the Nation’s capital, the beating
of a gay Wyoming college student, and the dragging and subsequent death of a
black man in Texas provide only a handful of examples of infamous acts of
violence perpetrated in the name of Christian Identity. However, while the
actions have relative notoriety in the larger culture and media, the theological
and religious claims that make the movement unique are often ignored. Yet,
these acts of violence cannot be detached from the deeper theological ideas that
motivate them.
This movement began in the 1940’s with theological ideas that distinguish
it from other forms of Christianity and Christian extremism. First, it supports
and justifies much of its violence through an ongoing race war between white
males and the rest of humanity. It establishes this idea of white superiority
through a peculiar interpretation of Hebrew scriptures, arguing that the lost
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tribes of Israel are in fact British, and that white English people are the true heirs
of God’s kingdom. Internal doctrinal statements attest to the importance and
5

centrality of their self-perceived racial superiority evidenced through theological
materials:
We believe the White, Anglo-Saxon, Germanic and kindred people to be
God’s true, literal Children of Israel. Only this race fulfills every detail of
Biblical Prophecy and World History concerning Israel and continues in
these latter days to be heirs and possessors of the Covenants, Prophecies,
Promises and Blessings of YHVH God made to Israel. This chosen
seedline making up the “Christian Nations” (Gen. 35:11; Isa. 62:2; Acts
11:26) of the earth stands far superior to all other peoples in their call as
God’s servant race (Isa. 41:8, 44:21; Luke 1:54).
6

For the Christian Identity movement, multiple creation myths explain this vital
racial differentiation. Humanity was not started as a single human, instead they
utilize different accounts for the diversity of races in the world today. For
example, they argue that blacks are not the children of Adam, but were created
as a lesser race before the creation of Adam, and do not share in the image of
God. Additionally, Jews are not part of the lineage of God’s created order but
the hybrid offspring of Eve and Satan, often depicting Cain as the descendent of
the devil, and the Jewish people as his lineage. Hybridity of races, from their
7

perspective, causes contamination, infections, viruses, and health calamities.
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This basic distinguishing factor between races supports the larger
narrative of an ongoing struggle between the forces of true white patriots and a
federal government corrupted by Jewish influences and conspiratorial power.
The Turner Diaries, a fictional account written in 1978 by Andrew MacDonald (a
pseudonym of William Pierce) details the struggles between a small band of
vigilante Christian warriors against the Goliath of the American Federal
government. After the passing of the Cohen Act, which outlawed the ownership
of guns and other weapons, this small group revolted against the government,
often resorting to the use of homemade bombs at the sites of Federal government
buildings. While a fictional story, the book serves as a kind of manifesto for
many within the movement who perpetrate violence, often eerily like acts
depicted in the novel.
In general, the Christian Identity movement harbors severe suspicions of
the government and retaliates against perceived conspiratorial plots that
undermine white power. In their own words:
With the growth of mass democracy (the abolition of poll taxes and other
qualifications for voters, the enfranchisement of women and of nonwhites), the rise in the influence of the mass media on public opinion, and
the insinuation of the Jews into a position of control over the media, the
U.S. Government was gradually transformed into the malignant monster
it is today: the single most dangerous and destructive enemy our race has
ever known.
9

Ongoing struggles against a corrupt and conspiratorial government justify the
use of violence, particularly against federal buildings and abortion clinics. These
violent activities are part of a larger narrative that envisions a coming
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apocalyptic battle between the forces of white males and the lesser races, that
will culminate in the overthrow of all secular governments and the establishment
of a global Aryan Christian theocracy.

10

Both the Islamic State and the Christian Identity movement share in a few
key features. First, they share in the apocalyptic insistence of bringing the
regular and mundane world to a cataclysmic end. Second, they both distrust the
powers at work in the world today. Third, they justify violence through the
corrupted political power in the world today. They share a general distrust of
globalization and the economic elites who benefit from rapid economic
expansion. Finally, and most notably, they share in a unique combination of
theology and politics. Both movements insist religious law inherently contains
more authority than secular laws. Each movement demands an apocalyptic
overthrow of the secular state and the establishment of a theocracy, and attaining
such goals stresses the use of violence.
Rendering the struggle between a religiously apocalyptic mythology and
a rational secular legal order relies on an internal idea of the secular state as
devoid of such spiritual, metaphysical, and theological tendencies. However, I
have previously shown that biopolitics relies on theological and religious ideas at
its very foundation (sovereignty and the Shepherd model of power), and as such
this struggle between the two cannot be imagined as a struggle between
theological fervency and apocalyptic visions against a cold, life-centered,
detached rationality. Both are theologically invested in some universalized
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vision of the world, though terrorism’s vision imagines a lack of production and
progress, and a fiery end to the normal functional processes of the law.
The biopolitical order does possess a series of theological claims, as
paradoxical as that may appear. Simon Critchley aptly describes contemporary
political ideas of biopolitical theological sovereignty,
here we approach the paradox of sovereignty: it is only through the
strangeness of the foreigner that the laws are seen to have authority and to
be binding on an autochthonous people. On the one hand, the law is and
has to be the free expression of the general will, the perfect interiority of a
people to itself, but on the other hand, there has to be a lawgiver, someone
who stands outside society by virtue of which the law has authority
beyond the self-authorizing acts of the general will. The only legitimate
law is one that we give ourselves, yet the law has to be given to us.
11

Neoliberal biopolitics demands an imminent law, established without reference
to a divine authority, completely imminent. At the same time, it requires
something that transcends the legal order, ensuring the law remains intact and
enforceable. Legal prescriptions only have authority in so far as one can witness
its enforceability. As pointed out earlier in the reading of Agamben, the
sovereign figure that ensures the enforceability of the law stands both inside and
outside. Sovereignty simultaneously enforces the law and yet stands outside of
it through the availability to suspending the law. It has in it a theological
conception, a divine sovereign figure that stands above and transcends the
imminent law while maintaining the claim that the law only comes about from
the collective agreement and manifestation of a symbolic contract between
rational individuals.
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The paradox that Critchley observes is analogous to Walter Benjamin’s
“Mythic Violence.” For Benjamin there are two distinct modes of violence within
this title of mythic violence. First, it announces the arrival and foundation of the
legal order itself, or the state. An example of this arrival of a new order might be
the French Revolution, a violent affair certainly, but one with the expressed idea
of establishing some new politically normative condition. Additionally, mythic
violence preserves the legal order. Modern politics for Benjamin, is a
dialectical rising and falling in the lawmaking and law-preserving
formation of violence. The law governing their oscillation rests on the
circumstances that all law-preserving violence, in its duration, indirectly
weakens the lawmaking violence it represents, by suppressing hostile
counterviolence.
12

However, divine violence disrupts and opposes this mythic violence from an
exterior position. It competes with and undermines the regulatory power of
mythic violence, in a way not unlike terrorism.
I brought up similar ideas in a previous chapter, but here I want to
combine these ideas with the concept of heresy as a means of explaining and
analyzing terrorism. A clash of competing orthodoxies exists between the
biopolitical state, and the Islamic State or Christian Identity. By explaining the
theological foundations of both examples of terroristic violence one can uncover
the orthodoxy that founds both groups. There is a kind of mythic violence
employed by terrorist organizations that founds their movements and regulates
their activities, ideas, and theological concepts. Both the Islamic State and the
Christian Identity movement have a regulatory concept of orthodoxy at work in
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their activities, institutions, and messages. Orthodoxy unifies disparate
members. David Christie-Murray’s work on Christian heresy opens with this
point of unity, as he argues the Roman empire adopted the Christian faith out of
a political desire for unity. Heresy, etymologically related to the Greek word for
13

choice, indicates an intentional movement away from this unity, and a challenge
to the regulatory power of orthodoxy. Similarly, the sovereign regulates and
maintains a legal order which can be upended by the presence of terror, so the
unity or orthodoxy finds itself questioned by heretical choices of intentional
resistance.
In the groundbreaking word Border Lines, Daniel Boyarin proactively
describes the rise of heresiology as the impetus and machine by which
Christianity and Judaism came to define themselves as overtly distinct and
different religious systems during the second century. In this mutual declaration
of heretical ideas of the other, they end up co-constituting each other through
self-reflexive antagonistic definitions. Through heresiology or “the science of
heresies,” Christianity and Judaism establish and maintain an internally
14

coherent identity predicated on definitions substantiated over and against the
perceived internal theological failures of the other. As a result, the very notion of
heresy constitutes the church, “Christianity, it would seem, or rather, the Church,
needed ‘Judaism’ to be a religious other, and some maintained and reified this

David Christie-Murray, A History of Heresy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1976), 1.
13

Daniel Boyarin, Borderlines: The Partition of Judaeo-Christianity, (Philadelphia:
The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 2.
14

139

term as the name of a religion.” Declaring the other as heretical serves the
15

power of differentiation to be productive rather than merely repressive. In a
similar form, biopolitics needs the religious other of terrorist organizations to
substantiate and define itself.
Continual problematic assertions of political and religious ideas by certain
groups are not met with repression; those groups provide an internal stabilized
identity for biopolitical neoliberal regimes to define themselves against, as
intrinsically different from. In the declaration of something terroristic, a
constructive self-identity, unbound to the claims of apocalyptic terrorism, arises.
The naming of something as terrorism consequently declares an internal theopolitical orthodoxy.

Biopolitical Orthodoxy:

Schmitt famously states that all secular concepts in politics are based on
theological concepts, and in this claim the workings of internal orthodoxy
already appear. While the contemporary world of biopolitics imagines itself
detached from universal and transcendental concepts so common in theological
claims, neoliberal forms of governance unwittingly rely on those very theological
ideas, namely the transcendental idea of the sovereign and the shepherding
model of leadership. The question then is how this process happens whereby
theological concepts are expressed in secular political discourse.
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One version of this hidden theological material emphasizes the
secularization process where language describes and articulates politics through
secular categories, while the ideas themselves have religious content. In
conjunction with this, Schmitt argues that liberalism, at its core, negates, rather
than produces, politics. The primary political idea for Schmitt is the friend and
enemy divide, yet liberalism negates this distinction in a few ways. Most
noticeably, it imagines a universal humanity extracted from political divisions
and subdivisions. Universal humanity undermines the possibility of an enemy
by which political formations become available. However, liberalism ultimately
fails at this ideological goal. Expanding the friend, and diminishing the enemy,
through the universalization of humanity may, on the surface, appear to support
peace, but the peace sought by this liberal agenda ends up producing more
violence, suffering, and warfare. Rather than a distinct, direct, and objective
enemy that the political establishes itself over against, everyone becomes a
potential enemy. When these potential enemies do actualize, the liberal state
attempts peaceful engagement in hopes of managing and solving the conflict.
For example, economic sanctions are a central tool in the arsenal of modern
neoliberal conflict. While having the appearance of a peaceful deterrent, they are
in fact designed to have direct material consequences on the livelihoods of
citizens. The threat of actual starvation and death are not logically detached
from the power and force of economic sanctions. Schmitt concludes his book The
Concept of the Political with a prophetic warning:
For the application of such means, a new and essentially pacifist
vocabulary has been created. War is condemned but executions,
sanctions, punitive expeditions, pacifications, protection of treaties,
international police, and measure to assure peace remain. The adversary
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is thus no longer called an enemy but a disturber of peace and is thereby
designated to be an outlaw of humanity. A war waged to protect or
expand economic power must, with the aid of propaganda, turn into a
crusade and into the law war of humanity. This is implicit in the polarity
of ethics and economics, a polarity astonishingly systematic and
consistent. But this allegedly nonpolitical and apparently even
antipolitical system serves existing or newly emerging friend-and-enemy
groupings and cannot escape the logic of the political.
16

The first co-constitutive orthodoxic claim by the biopolitical state
envisions a universal human species, allowing for the racial war developed in a
previous chapter, but it can also only be claimed over and against a system that
names and identifies objective enemies. The orthodox claim of biopolitics denies
all presence of an objective enemy, instead only declaring war against abstract
ideas such as the war on drugs, the war on communism, and finally in its most
recent iteration, the war on terror. Neoliberal biopolitical states do not fight wars
against other objective states and peoples, but instead against ephemeral ideas
detached from populations.
Heresy, then, appears in the formation and naming of an objective enemy.
For both the Islamic State and the Christian Identity movement a real, tangible,
objective enemy exists: Muslims who do not follow al Badghdadi’s narrow
prescriptive interpretations of the law, and anyone not white, respectively. The
identity of the enemy matters little for the orthodox position of the biopolitical
state, it could be any group; instead, the naming of a particular, objective enemy
makes the essential heretical claim.
Previously I have argued that whether from the perspective of the
economic factor, the excessive violence, or the religious fervency, terrorism fails
Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, (Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 2007), 79.
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to meet the biopolitical demand of instrumentalization. It resists, and
simultaneously exposes by its very absence of meaning, the failure of its
instrumentality. Upending the orthodoxy of usefulness demanded by the
biopolitical state, terrorism presses a heretical position. Emphatically
condemning terrorism as an economic negative betrays an internal messianic
orthodoxy of biopolitics. As one author describes,
This contemporary clash of titans is the most recent remake of a very old,
fundamentally religious scheme. Judaism and Christianity have, from their
very inception, entertained the hope that this world could be uprooted
and regenerated through and through by God’s Messiah, by a message of
liberation; and after Hegel’s strained efforts to transform Christianity into
a secular philosophy of the World Spirit, Marxism offered the secularized
version of messianism and claimed that single-minded social struggle,
propelled at all times by a ‘chosen class,’ would eventually make manifest
the ‘other world’ in the form of classless, scarcity-less society.
17

The economic markets of global trade, whether from a neo-Marxist perspective
or a classical economic perspective share in the inherent messianic potentials of
secularized political ideas. By engaging in acts completely devoid of messianic
hopefulness and optimism, and instead apocalyptic ends, terrorism commits the
heresy of uselessness. Demands for instrumental value only respond to acts with
no instrumental value. In a larger discussion of Islamic heresy, the author John
Henderson observes that many Muslim scholars are only polemical in their
writings when some heresy comes about that demands response. Orthodox
18

Christian Anrsperger, “A Federation of Way of Life: Towards a Globalized
‘Social Heresy,’ Revue Internationale de Philosophie Vol 61. No. 239, 2007, 84. Italics
in original.
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John Henderson, The Construction of Orthodoxy and Heresy: Neo-Confucian,
Islamic, Jewish, and early Christian patterns. (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1998), 11.
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ideas of Allah or the nature of the Prophet only enter into the discussion as a
response to some heretical counterpoint. Similarly, the naturalness of the
messianic and optimistic instrumental insistence by biopolitical states does not
require description and elucidation until something contrary and devoid of such
usefulness arises.
New political formations can arise, even movements that respond to or are
critical of biopolitical formations. Religiously speaking, we may refer to these
new communities as schisms, rather than heresy. Within the larger field of
heresiology the distinction between schism and heresy appears, as authors like
Tertullian and Cyprian employ both, though the distinctions may be difficult to
parse. However, while new radical political and religious groups can form
19

under the political dominance of biopolitics, they must share the internal
orthodoxic idea of instrumental value. Without some optimistic and rational
goal of making the world better, rather than hurling the world into apocalyptic
chaos, they will be dealt with by the state differently from terrorist organizations.
Even in utilizing violence, the discourse and descriptions of those violent acts
will lack the important political descriptor of terrorism.
Finally, heresy produces disharmony, and disharmony threatens the basic
and fundamental demand of an easily managed population. Describing the
conflicts between Catholics and Protestants in Paris during the 16 century, Dalia
th

Leonardo, describes disunity in strikingly biopolitical language. She states:
The League’s concern for the health of the religious and social body, and
its adherence to an organic notion of society remained a mainstay of
Catholic rhetoric through the Wars of Religion. Since Catholics’ view of
Geoffrey Dunn, “Heresy and Schism according to Cyprian of Carthage,” The
Journal of Theological Studies Vol. 55, 2 (2004): 573.
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community revolved around the metaphor of the body and the interaction
of its various members, the advantages of participating in the Catholic
liturgy provided numerous individual and communal benefits. However,
by denouncing and mocking the fundamentals of Catholic orthodoxy,
especially Christ’s real presence and the sacrifice of the Mass, Calvinists
had severed all ties to the Catholic community and were no longer
members of the body of Christ. It was only natural that conviction in a
corporeal metaphor would lead Catholics to view Huguenots as a disease
corrupting religious and social bonds. To borrow a concept from an
anthropologist, Mary Douglas, League rhetoric depicted the differences
between Catholics and Huguenots as a contrast between ‘holiness and
abomination,’ order and chaos, good and evil.
20

On the one hand, heresy frightens the orthodox with its apparent and overt
disunity. Through distancing by explicit choice from the larger orthodox body,
the heretic risks polluting and contaminating that body and throwing all into a
perilous situation. Terrorist groups in their heterodoxic naming of specific and
objective enemies, and the uselessness of their violence, risk contaminating the
biopolitical project in substantial and frightening ways. The war on behalf of the
species always takes the protection of the species from some contaminant as its
motivation and justification for violence. The heretical element of terrorism
contrasts with the pure, internal, easily managed orthodox population. On the
other hand, internal orthodoxic opinion fears for the heretic’s life, and potentially
afterlife. Dismissing the orthodoxic opinion threatens the community certainly,
21

but it equally exposes the heretic to divine judgement. Liberal care for the
terrorist, and their economic conditions often revolve around this idea of
heretical redemption. Solving for terrorism through increased economic viability

Dalia M. Leonardo, “Cut off this Rotten Member: The Rhetoric of Heresy, Sin,
and Disease in the Ideology of the French Catholic League,” The Catholic
Historical Review, vol. 88, 2, 253-254.
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and even more globalization often use the logic of decreasing terrorism, while
not taking seriously the internal religious and theological claims of terrorist
organizations completely separate from an economic context.
Finally, the most obvious form of heresy in terrorism is the use of death.
Biopolitics at its core, maintains a central orthodox concern over life, and its
flourishing. Terrorism centers on the concept of death. It is not uncommon to
hear the refrain attributed to Osama bin Laden and other terrorists, “We love
death as you love life.” Olivier Roy adds,
Now, the terrorist’s death is no longer just a possibility or an unfortunate
consequence of his actions; it is a central part of his plan. The same
fascination with death is found among the jihadis who join Islamic State.
Suicide attacks are perceived as the ultimate goal of their engagement.
22

At the center of terrorist violence resides the specter of death, the most anathema
of concepts for the orthodoxy of biopolitics. Neoliberal biopolitical states go to
great lengths to protect life, and demand the sacredness of life, while terrorist
organizations flaunt and center death as a direct oppositional theo-political
claim. Without death, terroristic violence would not level such a heretical claim
over and against the biopolitical unity of an orthodoxy that insists on protecting
life at all costs.
Showing the ways in which the biopolitical state constructs an orthodoxy
in response to, and alongside, the heretical ideas of terrorism might provide an
interesting intellectual exercise, but it does not yet provide distinct advantages
over and against other ways of articulating terror. Arguing that terrorism might
be better understood through the lens of heresy requires some description of the
Olivier Roy, “Who Are the New Jihadis?” April 13, 2017, The Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/apr/13/who-are-the-new-jihadis
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distinct advantages offered by this approach. This lens appreciates the ways in
which the contemporary divide in the ongoing race war espoused by Foucault
rely on deeply embedded heretical logic.
First, articulating terrorism as a type of heresy uncovers the ways in
which terroristic groups respond to globalization. More specifically, many
terrorist organizations attempt to return to a pristine and imagined past prior to
the ills and consequence of globalization. Taking as an example the heresy of
Pelagius, one encounters an argument for the sake of the pristine human. He
adheres to an absence in the inherent sin nature, instead conceiving of sin
through habitual action, and from this habitual activity one comes under the
judgement of their sins. While condemned at the Council of Carthage in 318,
other forms of this heresy continued after his death. At its core, Pelagius
envisions an ideal human apart and detached from sin. He tries to remedy the
more pessimistic view held by Augustine, whereby the human regardless of
action is always tainted by the reality of sin. Making this analogy certainly does
not advocate that terrorist organizations are good and without incredibly moral
flaws, but it does make the point that many terrorist organizations imagine a
world prior to the pollution and disenfranchisement of globalization. Like
Pelagius, they imagine a condition prior to the entrance of some faulty idea, in
this case globalization and economic disenfranchisement.
Heresy rarely springs up on its own accord, but often responds to some
fault established by the predominant dogma at the time. Pelagius responds to
the pessimistic insistence on the corruption of humanity, challenging the
commonly held idea of an ontologically sinful human. He hopes for a return to a
147

situation of truth, covered over by a mistake in the orthodoxy of the moment. In
a similar way, terrorism often foments at the opportunity of returning the world
to some idealistic pre-globalization. Of course, the imagined world prior to
globalization might not look the way the terrorist imagines, but that response to
the faults of globalization should remain an important part of any investigation
into terrorism. Likewise, a hope of an imagined pre-global age does not insist on
some romanticized and heroic excuse of the violence they employ. On the
contrary, condemning the violence can only really happen when actual
descriptions of motivations for that violence are provided. Further, it shows the
ultimate failure of the terrorist organizations, as I have shown the ways terrorist
groups rely on globalization and hypocritically chastise the very things that
make them successful (social media, technology, global trade, etc.).
Second, terrorism as a heresy does not stray far from Carl Schmitt’s
original political project, and it is surprising that this concept has not already
been developed further by Schmitt himself or contemporary political theological
interpreters of Schmitt. If all secular political concepts are rooted in theological
concepts, as Schmitt insists, then it appears odd that Schmitt never substantiates
his fundamental claim of the friend-enemy divide upon some theological claim.
Heresy exists in the most primordial theological moment, providing an
intelligible divide between metaphysical goodness and evil, prior to political
divisions. Heresy provides the option of rendering someone outside the grace of
the divine figure, with full support of that divine figure.
The social and political divides utilized for the sake of a race war rely on
the very early manifestations of a divide between correct and incorrect
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metaphysical articulations. Heresy may even exist at the inception of language,
as the moment one can name a thing in representational form, the ability for
error and misnaming occurs. Making an incorrect cognitive choice about the
nature of reality, in its most fundamental form, provides for deep material by
which humans can make distinctions between various groups. The failure by a
group or individual to articulate appropriate truth about the nature of reality
provides justification for a variety of social divisions. The friend/enemy divide,
at the heart of politics, relies on a heretical distinction. Terrorism, as the newest
manifestation of this divide, necessarily reestablishes the primal heretical
distinction at the root of human epistemological work.
Finally, framing terror as heresy focuses on the ways in which groups like
the Islamic State and the Christian Identity movement view the world in some
way that has been lost to the globalized biopolitical order. Terrorists, while their
actions and violence betray a substantial lack of meaning, do have some vision of
the world the biopolitical neoliberal order has lost. Again, this does not
romantically excuse the violence such groups employ, but even the most
repugnant actors in the world can still provide some insight into how people
view reality.
In the case of contemporary terror, a truth emerges over the precarity and
vulnerability of life, and the ultimate failure of a system that purports to protect
that life in some definitive sense. Biopolitical states eradicate life in a myriad of
ways, regularly resorting to violence, and often ignoring the suffering of its own
citizens, in systemic ways. The pollution of the earth, the pillaging of the
environment, the proliferation of weapons capable of destroying the world, the
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bio-piracy of crops, the commodification of bodies for sexual ends, and the
unhealthy fascination with guns are all endemic of a culture that hates life. Yet,
the entire political matrix sets as its goal the maintenance and protection of life.
Something appears afoul with these expressions of political goals and the
actualized social and cultural undertakings. The fundamental disharmony of the
neoliberal order, the simultaneous celebration and disavowal of violence, all
come into focus when one takes the ongoing heretical actions of terrorists
seriously.
Viewing terrorism through the lens of heresy says much about the actions,
motivations, and factors involved in terrorist endeavors. But it equally says
something about those citizens and participants in the neoliberal order. It
exposes those things hidden by the insistence upon life, and the ruptures of the
social and cultural dynamics that work against this agenda. Terrorism brings
back into focus the very fragility of life, and the impossibility of its protection.
Foucault speaks of the ways in which death vanishes from the vision of
the citizens of a biopolitical order. Hiding death in private ceremonies, or
transforming it into something artificial in video games and entertainment,
renders death invisible in the social order. Mortuaries provide a cover for dead
bodies, pushed out and expunged from regular social spaces. Ceremonies that
pay respect to the dead exist only the privacy of the internal family structure,
and even those memorials are undergoing changes, shifting from the exposure of
death to celebrations of life.
Yet, death remains part of the human experience. The attempts to render
it invisible fail, because we share this ultimate and final fate with the animals.
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We are going to die. Terrorism, at its most heretical, reminds of us of this reality,
even as biopolitical projects aim to hide and obscure it.
Terrorism cannot be solved by biopolitics, as it cannot even be adequately
explained. It remains fundamentally detached from a system that takes life as its
ultimate object, and the instrumentality as its primary function. Terrorism is the
pre-political meaninglessness made manifest in the center of politics. Like the
inexplicability and meaninglessness of death, a problem that cannot be solved by
politics of any sort, terrorism is the heretical reminder of this decisive and
ultimate reality of the human.

Conclusion

Terrorism defines current politics. Many political institutions,
mechanisms, definitions, and policies potentially relate back to the problems of
terrorism. It could even be said that terrorism serves a necessary functional role
in the construction of modern neoliberal political activities.
To fully understand and appreciate this necessary functional role
terrorism must be understood in accordance with the goals and prohibitions
embedded in contemporary political motivations. Like any formation of politics,
the biopolitical state arises with goals and ideas that energize its activities and
institutions. Namely, life has taken up a residence at the center of this political
moment. On the one hand, from Foucault’s perspective, this focus upon life
justifies violence for the sake of a body population, which it organizes and seeks
to assist in flourishing. For Agamben, life highlights the primordial distinctions
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and thresholds contemporary politics brings back to the surface in new and
unforeseen ways. For both theorists, and many others who follow their lines of
thought, life has been made political.
This making life political does not occur spontaneously but relies on a
long and varied historical development, that easily could have been otherwise.
For both, religion acts as a force within this historical development. Foucault
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uses at length the Shepherd model to characterize and describe the ongoing
developments and shifts in power, while Agamben relies on Schmitt’s ideas of
sovereignty rooted in the exceptionality of the miracle.
By highlighting this shared religious and theological material, I have
attempted to remedy something that appears in the ongoing literature devoted to
these two thinkers. Emphasizing this shared theoretical material does not equate
the theories of the two and make them synonymous. It does, however, work
against the tendencies in scholarship that overly focus upon their differences.
Their differences are important, and they are many; but the overlap between the
two should not be forgotten or minimalized. This predominantly appears in the

I use religion and theology interchangeably as both Foucault and Agamben
signal a reliance upon western Christianized concepts to define what they mean
by religion. Further, thinkers within political theology, as a specialized field of
political philosophy and theology, often use these terms without a fleshed-out
distinction. Obviously, theology takes on forms dependent upon the religious
histories and dogmas it speaks to. There are general ideas of divinity, separate
from particular religious histories or mythologies, that political theology often
utilizes. For example, the role of the miracle in Schmitt’s political theology could
certainly find historical realization in Christianity, but likewise it would be
similar in Judaism and Islam. To use them interchangeably here does not ignore
the particulars established by certain faith traditions, and the nuances that would
result in theology; however, in this case the nuances are less important than the
generalized concepts that come to articulate the specific theoretical ideas of
political theology.
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literature specific to Foucault and the diminishing of the religious ideas so
important and central to his work.
Further, I wanted to highlight the religious dimensions of each to show
the ways in which the institutionalization of biopolitics in neoliberalism
disavows the very religious ideas upon which it was constructed. Modern
biopolitics insists on an irreligious and secularized form of politics, while
simultaneously relying on religious ideas to support that political structure. It
disavows its own genesis, and this general disavowal of the religious nature
plays an important role in the importance and centralization of terrorism. For
example, the ways terrorism comes to be understood as a problem relies on the
religious fervency anathema to contemporary politics. Since terrorism often
relies on religious mythologies, ideas, and symbols it presents something
uniquely unlike biopolitics, at least from the perspective of biopolitical states.
This distance and difference biopolitics continually insists upon between its use
of violence and the terrorist’s, relies on this distance between the secularized
state and the overtly apocalyptically religious ideas of terrorists. Terrorism looks
and feels unique because biopolitically infused forms of neoliberalism disavow
their own religious mythologies, ideas, and symbols.
The ways neoliberalism centralizes terrorism reaffirms the disavowal
process. The emphasis on terrorism as an economic negativity disavows the
ways the economy, and the variety of securitization projects, rely on the presence
of terrorism. If terrorism were to vanish today, the economic consequences
would be enormous. Yet this ongoing war on terror provides a narrative that
insists on terrorism as a destabilizing factor for the global economy.
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The biopolitical insistence and focus upon the flourishing of life disavows
violence as a tool of an archaic past. Its use of violence takes on ethical and
political justification through the protection of that life it defines as worthy.
Make no mistake, violence has not been wholly disavowed, but instead requires
certain definitional elements rooted in the primordial distinctions of the state.
Violence emanates through the biopolitical state, but it must serve some
instrumental purpose of protecting that secularized and abstracted form of life.
Defining terrorism as excessively violent requires some foundational idea of
violence to define itself over and against other forms of violence. In this case,
terrorism appears to the biopolitical state as excessively violent precisely because
the violence it employs lacks efficiency and instrumental effectiveness.
The religious fervency of terrorists roots the process of disavowal that
shows up in the other ways biopolitics centralizes terrorism. To be clear, this is
not a defense of terrorism in any way, likewise it is not a defense of the
biopolitical state. I aim to only point out the ways that biopolitics has come to
define terrorism as something fundamentally in opposition to the forms and
modes of biopolitical neoliberalism. Imagining terrorism within the larger
framework of heresy remedies this series of disavowals in four ways.
First, it brings to the fore the forgotten religious shadings of biopolitics
and contemporary politics. Political theology in general has gone about this task,
and I merely offer up another way of envisioning the theological elements of
secularized politics. Heresy serves a non-exhaustive definitional role that
highlights the ongoing religious elements of the ongoing war on terror from both
the side of neoliberalism and the side of the terrorist. If one were to
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comparatively analyze the discourse that western nations produce they would
witness this reality. By framing the entire struggle in the language of heresy the
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religious dimensions are not forgotten and covered over by the appearance of
naturalized secularization.
Second, heresy demonstrates the ways in which each side of the war on
terror end up co-constituting and forming the other. Like struggles over
orthodoxy and heresy in the past, this struggle recurrently defines each side
unlike the other. For this co-constitutive element to work each side requires the
other side. Terrorism requires a neoliberal and globalized system to attack while
that neoliberal and globalized system require some enemy to define itself
against. This need of defining oneself against a perceived enemy might not be
exclusive to heresy alone, but heresy highlights the ways in which orthodoxy for
each relies on the perceived shortcomings of the other. Each does not merely
have an enemy that they disagree with over a territory or some limited resource,
but the differentiation takes on a more pervasive ideological element. By
examining terrorism through this lens of heresy, the struggle and war transform
from one of imminent resource struggles, to a transcendent ideal form of the
world.
Third, it highlights an internally established orthodoxy of biopolitics.
Predictably, this orthodoxy centers on life and instrumentalization. Of course,
those orthodoxic elements show up in the ways it defines terrorism: as a threat to
life, as a threat to the economic utility of the current system. Heresy allows focus

See Bruce Lincoln, “The Rhetoric of Bush and Bin Laden,” in Holy Terrors:
Thinking About Religion after 9/11, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2002.
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upon the ways in which biopolitics generates and manifests its own sincerely
established correct ideas about politics and society, and the resulting coercive
encouragement of the population to uniformity around this orthodoxy.
Fourth, heresy allows for novelty. This might appear as an abstract and
undetermined benefit of the proposal, but novelty on its own can be generative.
The entire structure of studying terrorism has come to a standstill, even while
terrorism expands beyond the established academic and political categories. The
transition to eco-terrorism, bioterrorism, cyberterrorism, and narcoterrorism all
produce new and unforeseen consequences for which traditional terrorism
studies cannot adequately account. Novelty in the study of terrorism can
produce new theoretical tools for understanding these different and divergent
activities that lack some of the hallmark elements of more traditional state
sponsored, religious, and political terrorism.
Likewise, heresy, while novel, can only do so much. It retains only a
limited scope within the larger field of terrorism studies. Future work needs to
be done, namely in the ways in which terrorism will augment and shift in the
future. New apocalyptic images, detached from religious mythologies are on the
rise, and attending terroristic endeavors, uses of violence, and destabilizations
will occur. Heresy, as a concept may be advantageous in this changing political,
religious, and social landscape.
More importantly, terrorism and neoliberalism are not the only forces
involved in these ongoing changes. Just as Christianity and Judaism were not
the only religions in the world during the 2 century, a time where they were
nd

both hurling claims of orthodoxy and heterodoxy, terrorism and neoliberalism
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are not the only options available for contemporary political movements. New
forms of rebellion and political change are certainly possible. However, if
neoliberal states produce the working definitions of the global political order and
these definitions disavow their center, working to hide the very impetus of their
actions, then genuine new articulations of political possibilities will always be
caught in resisting something not sufficiently understood. The point of this
dissertation was not to understand terrorism more effectively, and thereby
combat it with more precision. The real goal is to understand biopolitics and
neoliberalism more fully to produce new forms of political possibilities.
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